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1. Introduction 
 In the recent years European financial market integration has made a big leap forward. 
Yet, retail banking is lagging far behind. Most researchers and practitioners agree that 
banking markets are still least integrated, regardless whether they base their assessment on 
quantity-based indicators such as cross-border loans and mergers and acquisitions (M&As), 
price-based indicators such as interest rate convergence or new-based indicators such as 
reaction of the banking market to common shocks.1 Most recently, however, some quantity-
based indicators such as cross-border M&As reveal that banking market integration is gaining 
momentum - prompting some observers to conclude that the single European banking market 
is finally arriving (Schoenmaker and van Laecke 2006). Likewise, cross-border banking has 
been increasing rapidly, albeit starting from a very low base. Inside the euro zone cross-
border loans have more than doubled from € 152 billion (bn) in 1999 to € 361 bn in 2006 
while cross-border deposits have increased from € 221 bn to € 316 bn, respectively. This 
paper takes a fresh look at these developments by exploring the determinants of cross-border 
banking in the euro zone by means of a gravity equation approach. This research strategy 
allows us to not only document the state and progress of integration, but also to identify 
important drivers of and barriers to banking market integration with a particular emphasis on 
the limiting role of cultural and political differences. 
 Tinbergen (1962) and Pöyhönen (1963) independently introduced the gravity equation 
framework for empirical analyses of bilateral trade and foreign investment. Since then it has 
been extensively and successfully applied to a larger number of policy issues such as the 
effect of regional integration, a common currency or trade policies. Most recently, researchers 
have started to expand the scope of the gravity equation framework by studying the role of 
political and cultural differences. (Flörkemeier 2002, Guiso et al. 2005, Heuchemer and 
                                                 
1 Baele et al. (2004) suggest this classification of the empirical literature on financial integration. For a recent 
overview of the evidence see Kleimeier and Sander (2007). 
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Sander 2007, Kalemli-Ozcan and Sørensen 2007). Theses studies show that cultural 
differences, trust in others and confidence in institutions can be important drivers and barriers 
to economic exchange. Trust, culture and institutions might well be even more pertinent in 
cross-border banking. Berger (2003: 460), summarizing the findings of a well-known study 
on the globalization of the banking industry (Berger et al. 2003), concludes “that foreign 
banking organizations may be at significant competitive disadvantage in providing price, 
quality, and mix of services that best suit bank customers, and that such disadvantages may 
limit the integration of the banking industry” (italics are ours).  
 To our knowledge no study has yet investigated the role of cultural and political 
affinities in European retail banking in a gravity model setting. The authors have been granted 
access to a set of bilateral loan and deposit volume data for the time period 1999 to 2006 
which for the first time allows the (panel) estimation of a gravity model for cross-border 
banking. We begin our investigation by developing a baseline gravity model. This model 
starts with the classical Newton-inspired variables, economic size (as indicator for masses) 
and distance, and is then augmented to explore the basic determinants of the trade structure in 
the light of trade theory. Such augmentation captures the effects of comparative advantage 
(the “old” trade theory) as well as the role of product differentiation and economies of scale 
(the “new” trade theory). This baseline model is subsequently used to explore the impact of 
political and cultural factors on cross-border banking. For this reason we have collected a 
large number of political and cultural proxies. We consider a variety of specifications, 
including least square dummy variables (LSDV), fixed effects and dynamic panel estimation 
in order to obtain the best possible estimation. 
 Our baseline gravity model suggests that the direction of cross-border banking can be 
explained by the economic size of the trading partners as well as by comparative advantages 
in financial sector development and product heterogeneity as suggested by the “new trade 
theory”. Moreover, as it is well documented for merchandise trade, we can show that distance 
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and borders also matter considerably for cross-border banking. However, specification tests as 
well as theoretical considerations suggest the presence of strong country-pair fixed effects. 
Unfortunately, including country-pair fixed effects eliminates just these coefficients as well as 
those of other relatively time-invariant cultural and political variables that we are interested 
in. Our innovation to overcome this problem is to replace country-pair fixed effects by 
country-pair specific economic, cultural and political variables defined as country differences 
and measured as Euclidean distances between the individual values. In fact, cross-border 
banking, just like all international transactions, must be viewed as a response to differences 
that call for arbitrage processes. These variables are successively included into our LSDV 
model. Doing so, the importance of distance and borders as well as the trade-theoretic 
conclusion mentioned before remain robust. This model is then augmented for political and 
cultural factors. We find relatively little evidence for the importance of political factors and 
can demonstrate that cultural differences are a more important barrier to cross-border banking 
than differences in “governance”. In particular we single out differences in trust levels and 
legal system heritage as cultural barriers to cross-border banking. 
 The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology of our gravity 
modeling approach. Section 3 gives a detailed description of the data with a special reference 
to our measurement of cultural and political differences. Section 4 reports the results. Section 
5 concludes. 
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2. Methodology 
 We examine European banking market integration by analyzing the determinants of 
bilateral cross-border loans and deposits in the euro zone for the period 1999 to 2006 by 
means of a gravity model. Gravity equations have become the workhorse for analyzing 
bilateral trade flows and are arguably the best and most popular way to study the impact of 
third factors on trade, such as political, cultural and legal differences. The basic version of a 
gravity model explains trade flows between a pair of countries as a function of their respective 
economic masses (GDP) and the square of the geographical distance (DISTANCE) separating 
them. The model is completed by the gravitational constant (G):  
(1a) ( )2ij
jtit
ijt DISTANCE
GDPGDP
GX
⋅⋅=  
where Xijt denotes bilateral exports of country i to country j in year t. In order to obtain a 
linear relationship between the trade flows and the explanatory variables, the equation is 
converted into a logarithmic version: 
(1b) ij3jt2it10ijt DISTANCElnGDPlnGDPln)Xln( β+β+β+α=  
Geographical distance is considered to be a proxy of all bilateral transaction costs, ranging 
from pure transportation and information costs to hidden transaction costs like cultural or 
political differences. Since geographical distance can only be a rough measure of all different 
frictions in international trade the basic gravity model is usually been augmented by various 
factors such as to capture natural barriers (common border), political barriers (trade 
agreements, currency unions, etc.) and cultural barriers (common language, etc.).2 
Even though gravity models are able to explain more than half of the variation in 
international trade, they were considered for a long time as pure physical analogues without 
any theoretical foundation. Since Anderson (1979), who was the first to provide a micro 
foundation, many efforts have been put in the theoretical foundation of gravity models (e.g. 
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Bergstrand 1985, 1989, Deardorff 1998, Anderson and van Wincoop 2003). In response to the 
theoretical foundation the naïve version of the gravity model has been improved steadily and 
adopted to the different trade theories. A popular version in the empirical trade literature (see 
Baltagi et al. 2003) is:  
(2) 
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The variables SIZE, REL and SIMILAR are motivated by the recent advances of trade theory 
as suggested by Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Krugman (1980). SIZE is a measure of 
the economic masses and either defined as the product or the sum of the GDPs of the trading 
partners.3 The so-called new trade theory considers the coefficient β1 to be positive as a larger 
economic mass is expected to lead to more trade particularly in form of intra-industry trade 
under the conditions of heterogeneous products and economies of scale. REL measures the 
differences in GDP per capita as a proxy for relative factor endowments. Thus a positive 
coefficient for β2 indicates that bilateral trade is inter-industry and driven by comparative 
advantage as suggested by the “old” trade theory of the Ricardo-Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson 
type. In contrast, a negative value for β2 would indicate support for the Linder hypothesis 
                                                                                                                                                        
2 See e. g. Baxter and Kouparitsas (2006). 
3 A strict interpretation in the sense of Newton would demand to calculate SIZE as the product of the GDPs. 
Many empirical papers use however the (log of) the sum of the GDPs (e.g. Baltagi et al. 2003). This proxy 
allows an easier direct interpretation of the coefficients as the elasticity of bilateral trade with respect to their 
joint GDP. 
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which suggests that trade volumes are larger the more similar the trading partners are in terms 
of factor proportions and thus development. Finally, the new trade theory hypothesizes that 
trade is the higher the more similar the countries are. This latter point is additionally 
investigated by using the variable SIMILAR which is defined as a similarity index of two 
trading partners’ GDP and used to measures the relative country size. The variable increases 
in value with more similarity and is defined in a range from 0 to 0.5. A positive value of β3 
would therefore indicate that increased similarity would lead to more trade and also thus 
support the new trade theory hypothesis.  
However, since our analysis focuses only on a single good, bilateral loans or bilateral 
deposits, we have to take into account that these bilateral transactions may possibly be less 
sensitive to overall economic conditions as indicated by their GDPs or per-capita GDPs but 
more influenced by national banking market conditions. We thus adjust the gravity model also 
to banking market analysis. We retain SIZE as an indicator of relative masses, but use an 
indicator for relative financial development (REL_X) and of the overall similarity of the size 
of the financial sector (SIMILAR_X). There is some debate on how financial development is 
best been measured, for example as a ratio of broad money (MO) to GDP, deposits (DE) to 
GDP or private credit (CRE) to GDP4. Consequently our SIMILAR- and REL-variables are 
defined as follows with “X” being proxied by “MO”, “DE” or “CRE”, respectively: 
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 Since transportation as well as information costs play an important and restricting role 
in international exchange, DISTANCE, typically measured as the great circle distance in 
kilometers between two countries’ capital cities, is regularly included as a proxy for bilateral 
                                                 
4 For a discussion in the context of the finance-and-growth literature see e.g. Wachtel 2003. 
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trading costs. In line with the traditional gravity approach, β4 is therefore expected to be 
negative. Because distance is only an imperfect measure of transaction costs, BORDER is 
often added as second proxy of trading cost and is measured as 1 if two countries share a 
common border and 0 otherwise. As common borders are expected to boost bilateral trade, β4 
should be positive. In order to control for further different frictions in international trade, the 
gravity model is finally augmented by various factors as e.g. cultural and political similarities, 
Yijt. 
In principle, our baseline model (2) could be estimated by OLS. However, the 
estimation results are possibly biased due to omitted variable effects. These could reflect 
effects that are (i) common to all country-pairs but specific to any year t and (ii) effects that 
are country-pair specific but common to all years respectively. We therefore apply panel data 
techniques and define the error term uijt as follows:  
(6) ijttijijt ετλu ++=  
with τt capturing time effects and λij reflecting any time-invariant bilateral idiosyncratic effect. 
These unobserved effects may be considered as fixed or random. Since our sample consists of 
almost all countries that have introduced the euro as their common currency, we cannot treat 
our sample as a random draw from a large population. Therefore we hypothesize that it is best 
to consider λij as a separate intercept to be estimated for each country-pair. Because all 
countries belong to the euro zone, we also see the time effect as fixed, capturing economic 
shocks or changes in macroeconomic environment. In addition, year-specific effects may 
account for important regulatory and behavioral changes in the first years of the currency 
union. In order to substantiate our priors in favor of a fixed effects model we also estimate 
random effects models and run different Hausman tests. 
 Next to the static version of our fixed effect baseline model, we also estimate a 
dynamic specification, thus abandoning the assumption that the εijt are not serially correlated, 
since it may be likely that the current level of loans or deposits may depend on the previous 
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levels. In fact, habit persistence may be very likely in banking, which is often characterized 
by high switching and information costs. Therefore we include the lagged-dependent variable 
as an additional explanatory variable in our model. However, since the lagged-dependent 
variable is correlated with the country-pair effects and therefore with the error term, the 
estimators are biased. In order to deal with this problem we use instrumental variables and 
estimate by means of the generalized methods of moments (GMM) following Arellano and 
Bond (1991). Based on the estimation of the static and the dynamic fixed effects model we try 
to identify the best baseline model which should thus inform us correctly about the impact of 
the trade-theoretic variables in explaining cross-border banking. 
 The fixed effects approaches, however, come at the cost of not being able to estimate 
the impact of time-invariant determinants such as DISTANCE, BORDER or the cultural 
factors that we are especially interested in. In addition, country-pair fixed effects control only 
for bilateral trade resistance, e.g. the barriers to trade between two countries. In order to 
estimate a gravity model appropriately it is also essential to analyze not just bilateral trade 
resistance but also multilateral trade resistance, i.e. the barriers to trade that each country 
faces with all its trading partners. A widely used approach in literature to deal with 
multilateral resistance is to use country dummies (see e.g. Anderson and van Wincoop 2003, 
Baldwin and Taglioni 2006).5 This approach has also the advantage of controlling for 
incomplete homogenization of the bilateral loan and deposit data. We therefore will finally 
use a least square dummy variable (LSDV) estimation approach that controls only for bank 
countries (δi) and bank-customer countries (γj), but exclude country-pair idiosyncratic effects. 
We then define the error term uijt as6: 
 (7) ijttjiijt ετγδu +++=  
                                                 
5 According to the theoretical derivation of Feenstra (2002) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), the country 
fixed effects reflect also prices.  
6 Since we are primarily interested in estimation the influence of the time-invariant determinants we focus on the 
static approach and assume that the εijt are not serially correlated.  
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Unfortunately, the exclusion of country-pair idiosyncratic effects is also not without 
cost because the country-specific effects are not able to account for specific bilateral factors 
so that the omitted variable bias is still an issue.7 Our innovation to the literature here is to 
model country-pair-specific differences. The reasons are theoretical and methodological. With 
respect to the latter, we strive to keep the omitted variable bias as small as possible. 
Theoretically, cross-border banking makes only sense and should thus respond to 
“differences” which call for cross-border arbitrage. We distinguish and investigate the impact 
of a large number of county-pair specific differences, most – but not all – of them measured 
by means of non-time varying variables which proxy political and cultural differences. In 
order to create country-pair specific measures of these variable to substitute for the country-
pair specific effects we first measure each of our cultural and political proxies on a country- 
(and if possible year-) specific level and then calculate Euclidean distances between two 
countries for a set of variables as: 
(8) ( )∑
=
−=
K
1k
2
jtkitkijt VVED  
where ED is the Euclidean distance and V are the different variables that are taken into 
account. 
 Our modeling strategy is thus as follows: First we develop a baseline gravity model 
employing both, the pure trade-theoretic explanatory variable (3) to (5) as well as the financial 
development adjusted variables (4’) and (5’) using the various measures of financial 
development. Secondly, we test these models for fixed, random and dynamic panel effects 
and with then, thirdly, select the most appropriate model. Finally, based on the specification 
of this “best model”, we try to identify the impact of non-time varying cultural and political 
differences by augmenting a LSDV approach by bilateral factors measured as Euclidean 
distances as well as other factor when appropriate. 
                                                 
7 See Baldwin and Taglioni (2006). 
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3. Data  
 As independent variables we use central-bank data on outstanding cross-border loans 
and deposits. Cross-border banking data are typically either aggregated to show the position 
of a single country’s banks vis-à-vis all foreign borrowers or depositors or to show net foreign 
claims. In contrast, our data are disaggregated so that we are able (1) to distinguish cross-
border loans from deposits and (2) to identify banks’ as well as customers’ residence. Thus, 
our set of bilateral data allows us to analyze cross-border banking between the EMU member-
countries Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.8. We observe volumes of outstanding loans and deposits on 
a quarterly basis from 1999 to 2006 and are thus able to include a time-dimension in our 
analysis. As most of our proxies for potential driving forces of cross-border finance are only 
measurable on an annual basis we convert the quarterly volumes into annual ones by 
calculating simple averages over the four quarters. In sum, our unit of observation is defined 
as the outstanding volume of loans between banks of country i to borrowers of country j in 
year t (BILOANSijt). Correspondingly, BIDEPOSITSijt defines the outstanding volume of 
deposits from depositors of country i to banks of country j in year t. A first impression of the 
dynamics of European cross-border lending can be gained from Panel A of Table 1. Between 
1999 and 2006, the total amount of outstanding cross-border loans more than doubled from € 
152 bn to € 361 bn. Annual growth rates, ranging from 3.4% to 20.1%, are not only 
substantial but exceed growth rates for domestic loans in the Eurozone by a factor 1.7 (for 
2000) up to 2.6 (for 2005). The only year in which cross-border loans are slightly slower at 
3.4% versus 4.1% domestically is 2002. For the average (median) country in the euro zone, 
cross-border loans rose from € 1,747 m to € 3,341 m (€ 854 m to € 1,304 m) in nominal terms 
indicating an overall increase in banking market integration. However, when we compare the 
                                                 
8 Data on cross-border loans made by and cross-border deposits received by banks in Luxembourg and Portugal 
are not disclosed. However, cross-border loans made to borrowers in Luxembourg and Portugal as well as cross-
border deposits made by depositors from Luxembourg and Portugal are known. 
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average and median country over time we can observe that the distribution of cross-border 
loan granting is still highly right-skewed, indicating that the lending activities are obviously 
concentrated in a few countries. A look at cross-border lending relative to GDP of either the 
bank or customer country, however, provides a more differentiated impression of the 
dynamics of cross-border activities: Lending appears to be stable except when looking at the 
average (rather than median) country and when measuring cross-border loans in percent of 
customer-country GDP. This leads us to conclude that only some but not all customer 
countries benefited from increased banking market integration in form of more cross-border 
loans. Furthermore, cross-border loans are more important in terms of GDP in borrower-
countries than in lender-countries indicating that funds flow predominantly from larger to 
smaller economies. Panel B of Table 1 presents the corresponding data for cross-border 
deposits and similar conclusions can be drawn. It is interesting to note that while the volume 
of cross-border deposits was higher that the volume of cross-border loans in 1999, that is no 
longer true in 2006. For the average cross-border deposit outstanding, the nominal increase 
from € 221 bn to € 316 bn actually represents a drop in cross-border deposits when measured 
in relation to customer-country GDP. As the median statistics reveal, deposit market 
integration only increased for some of the euro zone countries. This hypothesis is also 
corroborated when we compare the average and median country. The distribution of cross-
border deposits is even more right-skewed than the distribution of cross-border loans. In 
contrast to domestic deposits, cross-border deposits seem to growth somewhat more slowly 
each year. The notable exception is 2006 when the growth rate of cross-border deposits was 
more than twice that of domestic deposits. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
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 As we are particularly interested in investigating the role of cultural and political 
differences, we measure the impact of these factors as Euclidean distances. To arrive at them 
we collected a large number of such indicators. With respect to cultural proxies it is a 
common, though rather vague strategy to use a dummy variable for the existence of a 
common language (LANGUAGE). A more sophisticated, and in financial integration studies 
successfully applied9 dummy is based on La Porta et al. (1998) which identifies countries that 
belong to the same legal family (LEGALFAM). A third measure of culture is the extent to 
which citizens of one country trust those of another country. Guiso et al. (2005) use such a 
directly measured bilateral trust variable based on Eurobarometer surveys. While this variable 
would be particularly appealing for our analysis, the latest data available date back to 1996. 
As Guiso et al. (2005) indicate, this variable is potentially endogenous, as more bilateral 
transactions are likely to breed more bilateral trust. We therefore conclude that this variable is 
unfortunately of no value for our analysis for the 1999-2006 period.10 We thus had to search 
for alternatives. A first alternative is to use the overall trust level in a society. Such data are 
available from the World Value Survey and have also been used by Kalemli-Ozcan and 
Sørensen (2007) in a study to identify the limits to financial integration. While these authors 
are using the level of trust as a determinant, we will here focus at differences in trust level 
between countries pairs, thus highlighting the – in our view – more important cultural 
differences. We thus measure TRUST as the Euclidean distance in trust levels across 
countries. A second alternative to measure cultural differences could be derived from 
Hofstede’s four cultural dimensions, a measure that figures prominently in the management 
literature. Based on the result of a broad questioning in more than 50 countries, Hofstede 
(1980) conducted a factor analysis to identify four different dimensions that can be used to 
                                                 
9 See e.g. Cecchetti (1999) and Sander and Kleimeier (2004) who identify differences in legal family heritage as 
a factor limiting European monetary and financial integration. 
10 We nevertheless have tried this bilateral trust variable with the 1996 values in our gravity approach. However, 
no significant effects could be detected. 
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describe national cultures. Power distance measures the extent to which the unequal 
distribution of power in organizations and institutions is accepted, individualism deals with 
the relationship of individuals with groups, masculinity expresses to which extend the 
distribution of roles between genders is predominant and uncertainty avoidance indicates a 
culture’s tolerance to unknown, surprising situations. According to the results of Hofstede’s 
factor analysis, each country can be characterized by a score on each of the four dimensions 
and these scores are the basis for our cultural proxy. Casson (2006) identifies as the four 
major dimensions of culture individualism, pragmatism, the level of tension and the degree of 
trust. He admits partial correspondence between his and Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, 
except for power distance which may in his view better be replaced by degree of trust. For 
our study we therefore define three alternative measures of cultural distances: First, we 
calculate cultural distance as the Euclidean distance based on four cultural dimensions of 
Hofstede (CULTURE). Additionally we define cultural differences in line with Cassen (2006) 
and calculate the Euclidean distance for the Hofstede factors where power distance is replaced 
by trust (TRUST&CULTURE3) and where the all Hofstede factors are augmented by trust 
(TRUST&CULTURE4). To capture the impact of political factors, we utilize the six time-
varying dimension of governance as defined by the World Bank: voice and accountability 
(VOICE), political stability and absence of violence (POLSTAB), government effectiveness 
(GOVEFF), regulatory quality (REGQAL), rule of law (LAW), and control of corruption 
(CORRUP) and calculate the Euclidean distance. In addition, we also aggregate all these 
dimensions into an overall political risk proxy (POL) that measures the general political 
dissimilarity between countries in one Euclidean distance. 
 Furthermore we also investigate the role of potentially explanatory time-variant 
economic variables such as bilateral trade (TRADEVOL) and foreign participation in the 
banking industry (FRGBNK). TRADEVOL is a bilateral variable per se. The role of 
FRGBNK is investigated for the bank country, for the customer country and also defined as a 
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Euclidean Distance. Details regarding the exact measurement of and data sources for all our 
variables can be found in Table A1 of the Appendix. 
 
4. The Determinants of Cross-Border Loans in the Euro Zone 
4.1. From Descriptive Statistics to the Baseline Gravity Model  
 A first insight into the potential determinants of cross-border banking can be gained 
from studying the differences between country-pairs with a large versus small amount of 
cross-border loans and deposits (Table 2). Looking at the beginning and end of our sample 
period and comparing country-pairs which fall into the top versus bottom quartile with respect 
to cross-border loans and deposits reveals that larger economies fund as well as receive more 
cross-border loans and deposits. We therefore hypothesize the SIZE matters. Furthermore, 
high levels of cross-border banking are typically associated with higher financial development 
(here proxied by our favorite financial development measure, the credit-to-GDP-ratio) in both 
bank and customer countries, while the role of the trade-theoretic variables SIMILAR and 
REL is less clear-cut. Cross-border lending and cross-border bank-FDI appear to be 
substitutes as more cross-border lending takes place when the market share of foreign banks is 
low in the customer-country. The same is true for cross-border deposits. Finally, regarding 
our various geographic, cultural and political measures we find that cross-border banking is 
high for countries with a common border, common language, a common legal family, where 
differences in culture and trust are smaller and where political risks are more similar. 
Interestingly, the geographic reach of cross-border loans and deposits has increased over time 
as the increasing mean for DISTANCE indicates. Regarding the role of deposit insurance the 
picture is clearest at the end of the sample period whereas the results for the beginning of the 
sample period are mixed. In 2006, countries that attracted a larger volume of cross-border 
deposits tended to have a deposit insurance coverage superior to that in the customer’s home 
country. 
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[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
The starting point of our empirical analysis of the cross-border loans and deposits is 
equation (2) to which we apply panel data techniques that take into account country-pair and 
time specific effects. Thus the error term uijt is defined as given in equation (6). As trade-
theoretic variables we employ the traditional GDP-based definitions (3) to (5) as well as the 
financial development adjusted definitions (4’) and (5’) using the various financial 
development proxies. Regardless which definition of these variables is employed, the result of 
the Hausman test confirms the existence of fixed rather than random effects (see Table A2 in 
the Appendix). We thus continue with static and dynamic fixed effects estimates in order to 
determine the best baseline model. The full details of the estimates can be found in Table A3 
in the Appendix, while we report our preferred regressions in Table 3. 
In order to relate to the traditional trade-theoretic specification we start with the GDP-
based definitions of the variables (3) to (5). Interestingly, this specification works to some 
extent for deposits but not loans. In the loan regressions, none of these explanatory variables 
are statistically significant, neither in the static nor in the dynamic estimation. However, in the 
static fixed effects model we obtain a high R-squared which is typical for gravity models. We 
therefore conclude that a bigger part of the variation in cross-border loans can be explained by 
factors that are country-pair and time specific. Moreover, the positive and highly significant 
coefficient for the lagged loans indicates that the data generating process is dynamic rather 
than static and that the cross-border lending is to some extent habit persistent. Finally, both 
the static and the dynamic fixed effects model perform better when time dummies are 
included. For that reason we conclude, that regulatory changes over the investigated period 
have an impact on cross-border loans. By contrast, cross-border depositing appears to be in 
line with a Ricardo-Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson explanation. Additionally, it can also be 
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explained by new trade theory arguments as the SIZE variable is significant and positive. This 
is confirmed from both, the static and the dynamic model. However, for deposits the evidence 
in favor of a dynamic model is less clear as the autoregressive coefficient is only 0.42 with a 
t-value below 2, thus giving a hint that the static model may also be appropriate. In contrast to 
the loans estimates, the exclusion of time dummies leads to better results and we suppose that 
regulatory changes play a less important role in the case of cross-border deposits. 
Given the relatively low explanatory power of the GDP-based proxies for trade 
determinants, especially in the case of cross-border loans, we hypothesize that cross border 
banking is possibly more influenced by national banking market conditions than by overall 
economic factors. Thus we investigate the role of relative development and similarity of the 
financial sector as defined in equation (4’) and (5’). We conduct all fixed effects estimates by 
using all three financial development proxies. The general message from this exercise is 
firstly, that loans now clearly show habit persistence while deposits do not. This result holds 
regardless of which proxy for financial development is used. Our estimates thus confirm the 
theoretically plausible hypothesis that international depositors are more mobile then 
international borrowers. Secondly, when investigating the various proxies further by 
comparing parameter stability between the fixed effect and LSDV regression as well as by 
looking into the data properties of deposits and broad money, we clearly favor the credit 
proxy for the loan and the deposit regressions.11 Thirdly, the inclusion of time dummies in the 
dynamic loan regressions is methodologically no longer necessary. Probably, regulatory 
changes are already captured in our proxies. This is different for deposits where we reject the 
hypothesis of habit persistence and favor the static model with time dummies, which possibly 
reflect an impact of regulatory changes that is not captured by our financial development 
proxies.  
                                                 
11 In addition, since the distribution of deposits is even more right-skewed than the distribution of credits, we 
prefer as an explanatory variable a variable based on credit. The same explanation holds for money, as deposits 
are part of the broad definition of money.  
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The regression results are reported in Table 3. Our reference regression for loans is the 
dynamic model without time dummies. It shows a plausible 0.7, though only marginally 
significant, elasticity of bilateral loans with respect to the sum of the partner GDPs. The 
implied (marginal) support for the financial variant of the new trade theory-hypothesis is 
reinforced by the positive and significant coefficient for SIMILAR_CRE, which indicates that 
country-pairs with a more similar financial sector are also having more bilateral loans. A 
financial comparative advantage hypothesis is not supported as financial development 
differences are not found to promote cross-border loans. With respect to deposits our 
reference model is the static fixed effects model with time dummies. Size matters, as 
indicated by highly significant GDP-elasticity of 2.5. As for cross-border loans, the 
coefficient is in line with the initial GDP-based estimation, though somewhat larger. This 
result together with the significant coefficient for SIMILAR lends strong support for a new 
trade theory explanation of cross-border deposits while the comparative advantage hypothesis 
is again clearly rejected.  
In sum, loans seem to follow an autoregressive process while deposits do not. 
Differences in per-capita GDP appear to promote cross-border banking in the traditional way, 
but financial development matters too. Country-pairs with equally developed and sized 
financial markets have more bilateral cross-border banking activity, possibly indicating that 
customers search for variety rather than exploit financial development differences. 
Nevertheless, there is very strong evidence for country-pair fixed effects and we can conclude 
that the variation in cross-border banking can largely be explained by country-pair and/or time 
specific factors. This clearly indicates the important role of bilateral determinants such as e.g. 
geographical distance, common border, culture, trust, legal system origin etc. which 
unfortunately remain unexplored in a fixed effects model. Moreover, these country-pair fixed 
effects may also be responsible for the insignificance of the pair-wise defined trade-theoretic 
variables that show little variation over time. We conclude that the results of the fixed effects 
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models suggest that country-pair specific factors are primarily important in explaining cross-
border banking. Unfortunately, most of these factors are time-invariant and can thus not be 
investigated in a fixed effects model. Instead, we will now investigate these factors in LSDV 
model specifications that build on our fixed effects reference models for cross-border loans 
and deposits. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
4.2. The Geography of Cross-Border Loans 
In order to identify the main driving or impeding forces, we next apply several LSDV 
specifications to the loan and deposit regression, respectively. In contrast to the static and 
dynamic panel approaches, we will model the country-pair effects separately as Euclidean 
distances in order to identify arbitrage and arbitrage impeding factors. Moreover, in order not 
to misread a general “multilateral resistance” to cross-border banking for bilateral resistance, 
we will in the following control for bank and customer specific effects by including country 
dummies. These dummies serve as a proxy for barriers to cross-border lending and depositing 
that each country’s banks face with all their customers. Finally, the country dummies will also 
control for all unobserved country differences in regulation, taxation etc. as well as for 
differences in the data, which are not fully homogenized. In the following LSDV models the 
error term in equation (2) is therefore defined as indicated in equation (7). 
The baseline version of the LSDV gravity model (Table 3, Panel A) already explains 
83 percent of the variation of cross-border loans, regardless of whether the trade-variables are 
defined with GDP or credit proxies. However, the estimates with the credit proxies are the 
more promising ones in our view. Consequently we concentrate our description here on the 
estimation in the last two columns using credit as proxy. Economic SIZE has a positive 
impact and the elasticity is above one, signaling both an important role for intra-industry trade 
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and a potential for an expanding share of cross-border banking in a growing euro zone. 
Likewise the positive and significant coefficient of SIMILAR lends also support for the new 
trade theory. However, our conclusion remains that comparative advantage still plays a role as 
countries with deeper credit market appear to grant more loans to countries with less liquid 
markets as can be interfered from the positive and significant coefficient of REL. Although 
the parameter estimates of the trade-theoretic variables are somewhat smaller than those 
found in typical merchandise trade estimations12, they indicate that cross-border loans may 
increasingly become an intra-industry phenomenon in the euro zone with product 
heterogeneity and economies of scale playing a bigger role.  
 As in merchandise trade, bilateral trading costs play an important role. The usual 
proxies, DISTANCE and BORDER are of significant influence. The coefficient for 
DISTANCE is with 0.59 somewhat lower than those regularly obtained for merchandise trade 
which are closer to one. Our estimate is however still substantial and clearly indicates the 
existence of an economic geography in cross-border lending. Likewise, a common border 
increase cross-border loans by 100*(exp(0.54)-1)=71.6%. We then investigate the role of 
economic variables (see Table A5, Panel A in the Appendix) in promoting cross-border loans. 
An obvious candidate is bilateral trade. We can indeed establish that bilateral trade promotes 
bilateral loans. However, since trade is highly correlated with distance, the coefficient of the 
latter will then become insignificant. Moreover, as trade may also be correlated with other 
cultural variables as suggested by Guiso et al. (2005) we continue our investigation without 
the trade variable.13 We also investigate the role of foreign bank participation in cross-border 
loan granting. Here we find a small substitutive rather than complementary effect as the 
                                                 
12 However, these results seem to be generally in line with the results Baltagi et al. (2003) have obtained from 
merchandise trade estimates when employing a similar model and using – like our model here – importer, 
exporter and time dummies. 
13 Table A5 in the Appendix provides all estimates of our LSDV reported in Table A3 with an additional trade 
volume variable included. The results are by and large comparable to the model without the trade variable except 
for the insignificance of DISTANCE. 
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presence of foreign banks in the borrowers’ countries reduces the amount of imported foreign 
loans (Table A4, Panel A in the Appendix, Reg 2 and 3).  
The strong presence of country-pair fixed effects, however, warrants further 
investigation as such effects point to country-pair specific differences as potential barriers to 
cross-border loans. We have therefore defined all political and cultural variables as well as the 
foreign bank penetration variable as Euclidean distances. We first report their role when 
adding them alone to the baseline model (Table A4, Panel A in the Appendix, Reg 4 to 17) 
and then include cumulative in the order of statistical significance (Table A4, Panel A in the 
Appendix, Reg 18 to 20). A language dummy (LANGUAGE) usually measures cultural 
differences. We tried this dummy but found it less convincing (i.e. insignificant) compared to 
the alternative and richer cultural variables. For cultural variables we use the Hofstede 
variable CULTURE, the modified Hofstede variables (TRUST&CULTURE3, 
TRUST&CULTURE4), the “distance-of-trust-level” variable TRUST and the legal family 
origin variable (LEGALFAM). All culture proxies have a significantly limiting impact on 
cross-border loans. LEGALFAM origin has the most significant impact, followed by TRUST 
and the Hofstede variable and its modification. Replacing the power distance dimension by 
trust does not improve the estimation while adding TRUST to CULTURE yield a marginal 
improvement. However, TRUST and LEGALFAM are the most significant cultural variables. 
We favor them for two additional reasons: First they are easy and reliable to measure and 
second they cover independent, important straits of cultural differences. This is not true for 
the Hofstede variable and its variation which is highly correlated with legal origin and will 
loose all its explanatory power when used together with LEGALFAM (see Table A4, Panel A 
in the Appendix, Reg 18). The governance indicators are, however, not very successful in 
explaining cross-border loans, regardless whether they are introduced separately or as an 
overall political risk variable. There is only some evidence that differences in “regulatory 
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quality” will reduce cross border loans while “voice and accountability”-differences will 
promote them. 
Adding the significant variables increases the goodness of fit while the coefficients of 
the baseline equation remain remarkably stable. Our preferred gravity estimation is reported 
in Table 3, Panel A: The elasticity of cross-border loans with respect to economic SIZE is 
now slightly below 1 and more in line with the estimates for merchandise trade. A common 
BORDER is estimated to increase trade by 61.6% instead of 71.6% in the baseline model. 
Explained cultural proximity may account for this difference. A similar TRUST level across 
countries, a similar degree of foreign bank penetration (FRGBNK) and larger differences in 
voice and accountability (VOICE) all increase cross-border loans. Finally, belonging to the 
same legal family system (LEGALFAM) increases cross-border loans by 73.3%. Thus, the 
evidence suggests that cultural (rather the governance) factors may continue to play an 
important limiting role in European Banking market integration. 
 
4.3 The Geography of Cross-Border Deposits 
In the following we again concentrate on our favorite regressions in the last two 
columns using the credit proxy for the trade-theoretic variables. Similar to our loan 
regression, the baseline version of the LSDV gravity model for deposits (Table 3, Panel B) 
already explains 83 percent of the variation of cross-border deposits. Economic SIZE has a 
positive impact and the elasticity is far above one, just signaling an even more important role 
for intra-industry trade and even larger potential for an expanding share of cross-border 
deposit taking in a growing euro zone. Likewise the positive and significant coefficient of 
SIMILAR lends support for the new trade theory. If we accept that a deep credit market is a 
good indicator of financial development, the evidence here speaks against a positive role of 
comparative advantage in cross-border deposit taking. The evidence strongly favors the new 
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trade theory and indicates that cross-border deposit taking may increasingly be driven by 
product heterogeneity and eventually by economies of scale. 
 As in cross-border loans, bilateral trading costs play an important role. The usual 
proxies, DISTANCE and BORDER are even more important for deposits than for loans. The 
coefficient for DISTANCE is with 0.75 higher than the corresponding number in our loan 
regression, indicating the existence of even stronger geographical effects in deposit markets. 
Likewise, also a common BORDER is more important for deposits than for loans. With 
respect to the role of bilateral TRADEVOL in promoting cross-border deposits we find a 
positive, though less pronounced role than for loans. Again, since trade is highly correlated 
with DISTANCE and BORDER, the coefficients of the latter are now much smaller, but 
unlike in the loan regression they remain statistically significant, suggesting that cross-border 
deposits are more independent from trade and do lead a more pronounced “own arbitrage 
life”.  
 When adding further economic, cultural and political variables we continue with the 
specification without the trade variable for reason of comparability and report our preferred 
LSDV estimation in Table 3, Panel B, column 4.14 The role of foreign bank penetration 
FRGBNK for cross-border deposits is now clearly a country-pair affair, rather than an issue of 
internationalization of the banking sector in the bank or customer country as such. In contrast 
to loans, more similar levels of banking market internationalization will lead to more cross-
border depositing activity. This result seems to be very much in line with the trade-theoretic 
implications of the baseline version. To model cultural differences by means of a 
LANGUAGE dummy is more convincing here than for loans, yet not significant at 
conventional levels. Moreover, the Hofstede variable and its variation perform poorly for 
deposits and are insignificant at conventional level, though still carrying the expected 
(negative) sign. Again differences in TRUST levels and a common legal origin 
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(LEGALFAM) are the relevant cultural variables, though trust level differences are less 
important than for loans while belonging to the same legal family is more important for 
deposit that for loans. In fact, belonging to the same legal family more than doubles cross-
border deposits (100*(exp(0.71)-1)=103.3%). With respect to political factors differences in 
political stability (POLSTAB) seem to lead to more cross-border depositing activity while 
differences in regulatory quality (REGQAL) inhibits cross-border depositing. However, using 
both variables in one regression results in an insignificant impact of regulatory quality 
differences. Finally the extent and differences in deposit insurance can be another major 
driver or limit of cross-border depositing. Deposit insurance coverage in euros matters in such 
a way that deposits flow when coverage is very different i.e. higher in the bank’s country than 
in the customer’s country (see the regression result for COVERAGEED in Panel B of Table 
A4 of the Appendix). This result is however only marginally significant, which might be 
explained by the fact that in several countries the regulatory coverage is extended voluntarily 
by banks or that many depositors move amounts abroad that are larger than the maximum 
amount covered by law. A stronger indicator is the fact whether the regulatory deposit 
insurance coverage is per deposit or only per depositor. Here, our results for DEPINSURE 
strongly indicate that customers move their deposits across the border if this allows them to 
shift from a depositor-based to a deposit-based coverage. 
In sum, we arrive at our preferred gravity estimation for deposits that is both 
comparable to the loan model estimation as well as differing to it in a plausible way. First, 
cross-border deposits show a higher (joint) income elasticity than loans, standing at about 
1.57. Secondly, diversification in similarly financially developed and internationalized 
banking system is an important driver of cross-border deposits, not differences and 
comparative advantage. Thirdly, geography is highly important with a common border 
propelling cross-border deposits by 100*(exp(0.63)-1)=87.8%. Fourth, deeply rooted 
                                                                                                                                                        
14 The regression results with TRADEVOL are reported in Table A5, Panel B in the Appendix. 
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differences matter for limiting cross-border depositing as clearly indicated by the 
overwhelming impact of legal system origin. However, favorable deposit insurance systems 
can, as expected, help to increase the level of received cross-border deposits. In sum, 
convergence of financial system are helpful to increase cross-border depositing, but economic 
geography and culture still sets strong limits to integration deposit markets.  
 
4.4. Robustness of the Results 
 As our prime interest is in estimating the impact of cultural, political and other 
limiting factors on cross-border banking we crosscheck the sensitivity of our analysis to 
various specifications. In particular we investigate to what extent the use of the trade-theoretic 
variables or the credit proxy has an impact on the estimated coefficients and whether a 
specification which includes the merchandise trade volume alters the results. The simple and 
very clear answer is that the estimates of the coefficients are rather stable across all 
specifications as can be seen from Table 4. 
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
5. Conclusions 
 Cross-border banking in the euro zone is still exhibiting a clear economic geography. 
In fact, the evidence clearly points to country-pair specific determinants of cross-border 
banking. One innovation in this paper is to model country differences as Euclidean distances 
and investigating their quantitative impact. This way we show that not only distance and 
border effects, but also cultural differences and legal heritage differences are important in 
shaping the bilateral pattern of cross-border banking and may well continue to exercise a 
limiting impact on banking market integration in the coming years. In this context it is 
interesting to note that differences in governance are of much less importance. A second 
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innovation of our paper is to modify the trade-theoretic formulated gravity model to allow for 
financial development effects. While the trade-theoretic formulation reveals a certain cross-
border-banking promoting role of differences in factor endowments, the modified version 
clearly indicates that cross-border banking is mainly promoted by similarity of financial 
systems rather than financial development differences. This effect is more pronounced in 
cross-border deposits than in cross-border loans. The latter clearly show habit persistence 
while the former do not. Moreover, when controlling for dynamic effects and financial 
development, we find significant time effects only for cross-border deposits but not for loans. 
This suggests that regulatory efforts towards a deeper integration of banking markets have 
been more successful in deposits than in loan markets. 
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Appendix 
 
[Insert Tables A1 to A6 here] 
Table 1: The growth of bilateral cross-border banking in the euro zone over time
total mean median
year
in millions of 
euro
in millions 
of euro
in % of 
GDP of 
bank 
country
in % of 
GDP of 
customer 
country
in millions 
of euro
in % of 
GDP of 
bank 
country
in % of 
GDP of 
customer 
country
number of 
country-
pairs
1999 151,976.3 1,746.9 5.1 10.6 854.0 1.5 2.2 87
2000 174,443.0 1,982.3 5.3 11.2 796.0 1.5 2.2 88
2001 205,113.3 1,991.4 4.8 11.1 647.0 1.2 2.3 103
2002 212,000.5 2,058.3 4.4 10.6 761.3 1.2 2.4 103
2003 228,407.3 2,175.3 4.3 11.8 850.0 1.3 2.1 105
2004 251,659.8 2,352.0 4.7 11.7 861.8 1.2 2.1 107
2005 302,286.3 2,851.8 5.3 15.0 1,165.0 1.7 2.0 106
2006 360,896.0 3,341.6 5.7 16.6 1,304.7 1.8 2.4 108
1999 to 2006 2,338.0 4.9 12.4 920.5 1.4 2.2 807
1999 220,806.0 2,453.4 4.8 17.9 369.3 0.7 1.3 90
2000 227,512.8 2,527.9 4.8 17.6 396.1 0.8 1.5 90
2001 235,426.8 2,159.9 3.9 14.7 387.5 0.8 1.4 109
2002 234,095.0 2,128.1 4.0 15.2 383.4 0.6 1.5 110
2003 244,686.0 2,224.4 4.2 15.7 453.4 0.7 1.2 110
2004 261,935.3 2,381.2 4.5 16.2 476.4 0.7 1.6 110
2005 267,398.8 2,430.9 4.8 16.2 502.9 0.9 1.4 110
2006 316,307.8 2,875.5 5.5 16.6 655.5 1.1 1.6 110
1999 to 2006 2,393.5 4.5 16.2 443.0 0.8 1.5 839
bilateral cross-border loan volume
Panel B: Cross-border deposits
Note: Descriptive statistics are based on full information sample of countrypair- and year-specific observations used in the
regressions. Means and medians are calculated across all country-pairs which have non-zero bilateral loan or deposit volumes.
Panel A: Cross-border loans
Table 2: National differences in bilateral cross-border banking
bottom 
quartile
top 
quartile
bottom 
quartile
top 
quartile
bottom 
quartile
top 
quartile
bottom 
quartile
top 
quartile
cross-border loans and deposits
loans or deposits as bilateral, annual cross-border loan volume (in millions of euro) 52.60 4,971.92 31.06 10,443.36 26.41 8,526.18 21.62 9,508.08
economic mass
GDP of bank country (in billions of euro) 386.36 1,022.35 342.27 1,407.47 271.18 1,009.07 402.45 1,155.50
GDP of customer country (in billions of euro) 438.65 855.45 551.86 912.91 372.67 972.88 495.89 1,028.83
total GDP of bank and customer country (in billions of euro) 825.01 1,877.80 894.14 2,320.37 6.18 7.46 6.58 7.55
financial development
credit to the private sector in % of GDP in bank country 0.80 1.00 0.98 1.21 0.77 1.01 1.02 1.26
credit to the private sector in % of GDP in customer country 0.91 0.97 1.14 1.34 0.87 1.00 1.16 1.37
difference between credit to the private sector in bank versus customer country 1.48 1.30 1.46 1.45 0.43 0.23 0.40 0.33
similarity of credit to the private sector in bank versus customer country 0.30 0.27 0.33 0.33 -1.35 -1.48 -1.24 -1.25
market share of foreign banks in bank country 11.26 17.67 31.84 13.25 15.53 13.81 32.03 15.33
market share of foreign banks in customer country 20.78 19.17 32.05 24.88 21.25 18.07 29.35 24.23
market share of foreign banksED 19.40 23.91 26.30 20.99 22.53 19.70 26.10 22.52
deposit insurance coverage in euro for bank country 27,969.19 28,478.26 30,709.79 37,199.38
deposit insurance coverage in euro for customer country 26,664.84 31,230.06 30,949.38 30,117.55
deposit insurance per depositorD for bank country 0.74 0.78 0.86 0.82
deposit insurance per depositorD for customer country 0.87 0.87 0.82 0.89
deposit insurance preference 0.57 0.54 0.48 0.54
geographic, cultural and political features
common legal familyD 0.27 0.36 0.33 0.48 0.09 0.48 0.32 0.50
common borderD 0.05 0.50 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.70 0.04 0.57
common languageD 0.05 0.23 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.29
distance in km between capital cities 1,691.39 920.44 2,005.67 881.16 1,836.17 806.92 2,031.41 779.98
cultureED 2.67 2.32 2.98 2.28 2.55 2.14 2.89 2.22
trustED 1.11 0.63 1.11 0.77 1.21 0.75 1.12 0.81
World Bank's worldwide governance indicators:
  overall political riskED 0.01 -0.11 0.55 -0.01 1.04 0.86 1.87 1.00
  control of corruptionED 1.21 1.04 1.21 0.61 1.04 0.86 1.15 0.48
  government effectivenessED 0.46 0.37 0.86 0.49 0.33 0.26 0.83 0.39
  polical stability and absence of violenceED 1.21 1.04 1.95 1.18 0.33 0.33 0.57 0.38
  regulatory qualityED 0.48 0.51 0.55 0.40 0.44 0.43 0.52 0.36
  voice and accountabilityED 0.21 0.19 0.35 0.23 0.17 0.16 0.32 0.21
  rule of lawED 0.48 0.35 0.81 0.49 0.40 0.26 0.77 0.37
number of counrypair-specific observations in quartile 22 22 27 27 23 23 28 28
cross-border loans cross-border deposits
1999 2006
mean across all observations in cross-border-loan-quartile for variable:
1999 2006
Note: Quartiles are formed based on the bilateral cross-border loan or deposit volume. Subscript D indicates a dummy variable, subscript ED indicates that the variable is measured as the Euclidean
distance between the customer and bank country. Higher Euclidean distances indicate higher differences between countries. 
GDP proxies 
for SIMILAR 
and REL
credit market 
proxies for 
SIMILAR and REL
GDP proxies 
for SIMILAR 
and REL
credit market 
proxies for 
SIMILAR and REL
baseline baseline baseline baseline baseline preferred baseline preferred
Panel A: Cross-border loans
constant 12.84 12.22 3.07 5.09
2.18 2.33 1.15 2.00
SIZE 0.56 0.83 0.48 0.70 -0.45 -0.36 1.32 0.84
0.81 1.18 0.43 1.67 -0.42 -0.38 2.90 1.97
SIMILAR -0.45 -0.20 0.22 0.52 -0.24 -0.02 0.54 0.51
-1.44 -0.92 0.31 2.20 -0.44 -0.04 2.38 2.31
REL 0.63 -0.07 0.75 -0.08 0.75 0.59 0.43 0.54
1.51 -0.33 1.53 -0.24 2.60 2.27 2.00 2.45
ln(DISTANCE) -0.65 -0.65 -0.59 -0.56
-6.19 -6.43 -6.44 -6.10
BORDERD 0.53 0.45 0.54 0.48
5.48 5.04 5.79 5.46
ln(TRUSTED) -0.24 -0.24
-5.46 -5.11
LEGALFAMD 0.56 0.55
5.44 5.37
ln(FRGBNKED) 0.10 0.13
2.69 3.40
ln(VOICEED) 0.16 0.14
4.67 3.73
ln(BILOANSt-1) 0.37 0.62
3.37 6.56
countrybank dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
countrycustomer dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
year dummies Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sargan test 22.17 28.62
p-value 0.33 0.10
m2 -0.71 -0.89
p-value 0.48 0.37
adjusted R2 0.930 0.938 0.830 0.844 0.830 0.844
number of observations 842 807 618 603 842 842 807 807
Panel B: Cross-border deposits
constant 2.96 2.11 1.92 1.96
0.44 0.33 0.78 0.76
SIZE 1.58 2.50 1.21 0.73 1.60 1.63 1.81 1.57
2.31 3.32 2.14 1.39 1.30 1.41 4.40 3.91
SIMILAR -0.32 0.83 -0.19 0.62 0.64 0.73 0.71 0.65
-0.72 4.13 -0.32 2.64 1.02 1.25 3.71 3.57
REL 2.87 -0.17 1.65 0.10 0.88 0.86 -0.33 -0.50
9.22 -0.84 2.83 0.42 4.03 4.32 -1.91 -2.93
ln(DISTANCE) -0.84 -0.79 -0.75 -0.68
-8.17 -7.45 -7.38 -6.53
BORDERD 0.56 0.54 0.64 0.63
4.99 5.03 5.61 5.87
ln(TRUSTED) -0.17 -0.18
-3.93 -4.01
LEGALFAMD 0.75 0.71
6.82 6.45
ln(FRGBNKED) -0.05 -0.09
-1.65 -2.56
ln(POLSTABED) 0.10 0.11
3.70 3.76
DEPINSURE 1.33
2.69
ln(BIDEPOSITSt-1) 0.42 0.39
1.98 1.72
countrybank dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
countrycustomer dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
year dummies Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sargan test 25.24 24.05
p-value 0.19 0.24
m2 -1.22 -1.16
p-value 0.22 0.25
adjusted R2 0.950 0.944 0.835 0.847 0.834 0.847
number of observations 877 839 655 637 877 877 839 839
GDP proxies for SIMILAR and 
REL
credit market proxies for 
SIMILAR and REL
Note: In each regression, the dependent variable is the log of bilateral cross-border loan or deposit volume. The two-way fixed effects model is estimated with White-robust
standard errors. The dynamic model uses the Arellano-Bond (1991) 2-step generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator. The difference of the lagged dependent variable and
its lags as well as the exogonous variables are used as instruments. For each coefficient, the first row shows the estimated coefficient and the second row the t- or z-statistic. Sargan
test examines the overidentifying restrictions. If the null hypothesis is not rejected the instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the error term and therefore valid. The Arellano-
Bond test (m2) examines the hypothesis that there is no second-order autocorrelation in the residuals. The Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) model is estimated as OLS with
White-robust standard errors. For each coefficient, the first row shows the estimated coefficient and the second row the t-statistic. The subscript D indicates a dummy variable. The
subscript ED indicates a variable measured as an Euclidean distance. 
Table 3: Determinants of cross border banking
Fixed effects Dynamic LSDV
Table 4: Limiting or promoting factors on cross-border banking
ln(FRGBNKbank country) -0.05 -0.06 -0.09 -0.10 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03
ln(FRGBNKcustomer country) -0.14 * -0.12 -0.15 * -0.15 * -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03
ln(FRGBNKED) 0.11 * 0.12 0.08 * 0.10 * -0.10 * -0.09 * -0.07 * -0.06
LANGUAGED 0.11 0.00 0.02 -0.07 0.24 0.18 0.07 0.03
ln(CULTUREED) -0.34 * -0.28 * -0.35 * -0.33 * -0.07 -0.05 -0.19 -0.18
ln(TRUST&CULTURE3) -0.33 * -0.19 * -0.32 * -0.25 * -0.05 0.01 -0.09 -0.05
ln(TRUST&CULTURE4) -0.39 * -0.29 * -0.38 * -0.33 * -0.15 -0.09 -0.23 * -0.20 *
ln(TRUSTED) -0.24 * -0.18 * -0.23 * -0.20 * -0.22 * -0.19 * -0.22 * -0.19 *
LEGALFAMD 0.66 * 0.54 * 0.67 * 0.59 * 0.74 * 0.65 * 0.78 * 0.72 *
ln(POLED) -0.01 * 0.09 0.06 0.14 0.03 0.12 -0.02 0.06
ln(CORRUPED) -0.01 0.04 0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.02
ln(GOVEFFED) 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.07 * 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.02
ln(POLSTABED) -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.06 * 0.09 * 0.05 0.08 *
ln(REGQALED) -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.07 -0.03 -0.08 * -0.05
ln(VOICEED) 0.09 * 0.10 * 0.12 * 0.13 * 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.06
ln(LAWED) 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.07 * -0.03 0.01
ln(COVERAGEbank country) 0.28 0.31 -0.44 -0.35
ln(COVERAGEcustomer country) -0.61 -0.94 -0.56 -0.90
ln(COVERAGEED) -0.29 * -0.26 * -0.23 * -0.21 *
ln(COVRATIObank country) -0.81 -0.80 -0.40 -0.39
ln(COVRATIOcustomer country) 0.29 0.13 0.45 0.31
ln(COVRATIOED) 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.00
DEPINSD, bank country -0.67 * -0.70 * -0.71 -0.70
DEPINSD, customer country 1.54 * 2.92 * 0.93 2.07
DEPINSURE 1.33 * 1.39 * 1.43 1.40
Deposits
Note: A Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) model is estimated as OLS with White-robust standard errors. The subscript D indicates a dummy variable.
The subscript ED indicates a variable measured as an Euclidean distance. Each explanatory variable is included separately in the respective baseline model
presented in Table 3. * indicates significance at least at 10%.
Loans
without 
TRADEVOL
including 
TRADEVOL
without 
TRADEVOL
including 
TRADEVOL
Credit market proxies for 
SIMILAR and REL
GDP proxies for SIMILAR 
and REL
Credit market proxies for 
SIMILAR and REL
without 
TRADEVOL
including 
TRADEVOL
without 
TRADEVOL
GDP proxies for SIMILAR 
and REL
including 
TRADEVOL
Table A-1: Description of variables
variable description variable format used in 
regressions
details and source
BILOANS bilateral cross border loan 
volume
ln, variation across ijt Outstanding bilateral, cross-border loan volume in millions of euros in year t. All loans from monetary and financial 
institutions (MFIs) in country i to non-MFI borrowers in country j are included. 
BIDEPOSITS bilateral cross-border deposit 
volume
ln, variation across ijt Outstanding bilateral, cross-border deposit volume in millions of euros in year t. All deposits from MFIs in country i 
to non-MFI borrowers in country j are included.
GDP gross domestic product variation across it or jt GDP in billions of euro of country i (or j) in year t. GDP is measured at current prices and is not seasonally adjusted 
except for Portugal for which the GDP is seasonally adjusted. Source: Eurostat's series ESNGDPA for all countries 
except Greece and Luxembourg. For these two countries, the series 99B..A from the IMF's IFS are used. 
POP populationit  populationjt Population of country i (or j) in million in mid-year t. Source: Series I99Z..O from the IMF's IFS.
CREDIT privat credit to GDP variation across it or jt Credit to private sector as percent of gdp for country i (or j) in year t. Source: IMF's IFS credit series Y32D..A and 
GDP as defined above.
MONEY moneyit to GDP variation across it or jt Money of country i (or j) in year t is defined as currency plus deposits in percent of GDP. Source: IMF's IFS currency 
series Y34A.NA, demand deposit series Y34B.NA and other deposit series Y35..NA. GDP as defined above.
DEPOSIT depositit to GDP variation across it or jt Deposits as percent of GDP for country i (or j) in year t. Source: IMF's IFS demand deposit series Y3B.NA and other 
deposit series Y35..NA. GDP as defined above.
SIZE combined economic masses ln, variation across ijt = ln(GDPit + GDPjt). Total size of the economy of country i and j.
REL absolute difference in per capita 
GDP
ln, variation across ijt = | ln(GDPit/POPit)-ln(GDPjt/POPjt)|
SIMILAR similarity index of country-pair 
GDPs
ln, variation across ijt = ln(1 - (GDPit /(GDPit+GDPjt))
2 - (GDPit/(GDPit+GDPjt)
2). The similarity of GDP in country i versus j. 
REL_X relative size of credit markets ln, variation across ijt = | ln(Xit) - ln(Xjt) |. The absolute difference between financial development in country i versus j.
SIMILAR_X similarity of credit markets ln, variation across ijt = ln(1 - ((Xit*GDPit) /((Xit*GDPit) + (Xjt*GDPjt)))
2 - ((Xit*GDPit) /((Xit*GDPit) + (Xjt*GDPjt)))
2). The similarity 
index for financial developemnt in country i versus j. 
Alternative definitions for the financial development proxy X are used: CREDIT, MONEY, DEPOSIT
DISTANCE distance ln, variation across ij Distance in km between the capital cities of countries i and j. Source: http://www.wcrl.ars.usda.gov/cec/java/lat-
long.htm. New link: http://www.chemical-ecology.net/java/lat-long.htm
BORDER common border dummy, variation across ij Dummy equal to 1 if countries i and j have a common border. The following countries have a common border: Austri
Germany, Austria-Italy, Belgium-France, Belgium-Germany, Belgium-Luxembourg, Belgium-Netherlands, Denmark-
Germany, France-Germany, France-Italy, France-Luxembourg, France-Spain, Germany-Luxembourg, Germany-
Netherlands, Portugal-Spain.
FRGBNK asset share of foreign banks ln, euclidean distance, 
variation across ijt
Asset share of foreign banks in banking market of country i (or j). Measured as total assets of foreign branches and 
subsidiaries of credit institutions (CIs) from EU and 3rd countries as percent of total assets of domestic CIs. Source 
for data for 1999 to 2000: ECB (2004), tables 8, 21, 23, 25 and 27 from annex 1. Source for data for 2001 to 2005: 
ECB (2006), tables 2, 11 and 13 from annex 1. Data for 2006 is not yet available and data for 2005 is used instead.
LANGUAGE common language dummy, variation across ij Dummy equal to 1 if countries i and j have common language. The following country-pairs are considered to have a 
common language: Germany-Austria, Belgium-France, Belgium-Netherlands, Austria-Luxembourg, Belgium-
Luxembourg, Germany-Luxembourg, France-Luxembourg. 
CULTURE culture ln, euclidean distance, 
variation across ij
Four cultural dimensions of Hofstede. Estimated values are used for Luxembourg. Source: http://www.geert-
Hofstede.com /hofstede_dimensions.php?culture1=86&culture2=18Appeal
TRUST trust euclidean distance, variation 
across ij
The extend to which citizens of country i trust country j. This time-invariant proxy is based on several Eurobarometer 
surveys from 1970 to 1995 and scaled from 1 to 4 with higher values indicating more trust. Source: Table 1 of Guiso, 
Sapienza and Zingales (2004).  
Table A-1: Description of variables
variable description variable format used in 
regressions
details and source
TRUST&CULTURE4 trust and culture ln, euclidean distance, 
variation across ij
Combination of trust and Hofstede's 4 cultural dimensions.
TRUST&CULTURE3 trust and culture excluding 
power distance
ln, euclidean distance, 
variation across ij
Combination of trust and Hofstede's cultural dimensions excluding Hofstede's power distance dimension.
LEGALFAM legal family dummy, variation across ij Dummy equal to 1 if countries i and j belong to same legal family. Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands and Spain are 
considered to be of French legal origin. Austria and Germany are of German legal origin. Source: La Porta et al. 
(1998).
VOICE voice and accountabily
POLSTAB polical stabily and absence of 
violence
GOVEFF government effectiveness
REGQAL regulatory quality
LAW rule of law
CORRUP control of corruption
POL polical risk ln, euclidean distance, 
variation across ijt
Euclidean distance between the political risk of countries i and j based on the six dimensions of the World Bank's 
Worldwide Governance Indicators dataset.
TRADEVOL trade volume ln =ln(exportsijt + importsijt). Exports from country i to country j and imports into country i from country j in year t in 
millions of euros at current prices. Source: IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics. Exports and imports are originally 
reported in US dollar and are converted to euros using Datastream's the end-of-year exchange rate USOCC007.
DEPINS deposit insurance dummy, variation across i or j dummy coded 1 if deposit insurance coverage in 2003 is per depositor and 0 if coverage is per deposit. Source: 
Deposit Insurance around the world dataset (DIWD) Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli, Baybars Karacaovali and Luc Laeven, 
(2005), "Deposit Insurance around the World: A Comprehensive Database," Policy Research Working Paper #3628, 
Washington, DC: World Bank. Dermine, 2005, EUROPEAN BANKING INTEGRATION: Don’t Put the Cart before
the Horse, working paper, table 11. 
DEPINSURE deposit insurance preference variation across ij Indicator variable based on country-specific dummy coded 1 if deposit insurance coverage in 2003 is per depositor 
and 0 if coverage is per deposit. DEPINSURE is coded as follows: 1 if coverage is per depositor in customer country 
and per deposit in bank country; 0 if coverage is per deposit in customer country and per depositor in bank country; 
0.5 is coverage is the same in bank and customer country. A higher value thus indicates that the foreign country has 
better insurance. Source: DIWD and Dermine (2005).
COVERAGE deposit insurance coverage ln, euclidean distance, 
variation across ijt
= ln(deposit insurance coverage in euros). Source: DIWD and Dermine (2005). 
COVRATIO deposit insurance coverage ratio ln, variation across ijt = ln(deposit insurance coverage in euros / deposits per capita in euros). Source for deposit insurance coverage: DIWD 
and Dermine (2005). Source for deposits per capita: IFS such that deposits per capita = total deposits / population = 
(demand deposits + non-demand deposits) / population = IFS lines (24..UB + 25..UB ) / 99Z..O. Exception is Greece 
in 1999 and 2000 where DIWD data is used.
D_YEAR time dummy dummy, variation across t Dummy equal to 1 for loan volume outstanding in a given year and 0 otherwise. A separate dummy exists for each 
year from 1999 to 2006.
D_BANK bank-country dummy dummy, variation across i Dummy equal to 1 for loans made by MFIs of country i. A separate dummy exists for each country: Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and Spain.
D_CUSTOMER customer-country dummy dummy, variation across j Dummy equal to 1 for loans made to borrowers of country j. A separate dummy exists for each country: Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Luxembourg, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain
World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators for country i (or j) in year t. The indicators are measured in units 
ranging from about -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance outcomes. Source: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/. Annual data is available for 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 
2006. Thus, values for 1999 and 2001 are calculated as the average of two surrounding years. 
ln, euclidean distance, 
variation across ijt
Table A2: Comparison of Estimators: Random Effects vs Fixed Effects Approach
SIZE 2.10 * 2.42 * 1.56 * 0.83 1.57 * 2.15 * 0.70 ** 0.67 1.83 * 1.90 * 1.39 * -0.13 1.06 * 1.50 * 0.42 -0.49
12.78 9.57 6.43 1.18 6.87 7.05 2.16 0.93 11.40 7.40 4.92 -0.18 4.82 4.95 1.22 -0.67
SIMILAR 0.27 0.18 0.02 -0.20 0.20 0.16 -0.14 -0.20 0.13 0.22 -0.17 -0.90 *** -0.09 0.20 -0.51 -0.93 ***
1.64 1.23 0.09 -0.92 1.21 1.12 -0.74 -0.92 0.48 0.52 -0.51 -1.67 -0.35 0.48 -1.58 -1.73
REL -0.01 -0.06 -0.13 -0.07 0.00 -0.06 -0.12 -0.06 0.64 0.87 ** 0.61 *** 0.98 ** 0.89 * 0.90 ** 0.77 ** 1.01 **
-0.03 -0.28 -0.63 -0.33 0.01 -0.31 -0.57 -0.30 1.96 ** 2.17 1.81 2.46 2.72 2.27 2.30 2.54
ln(TRADEVOL) 0.37 * 0.23 0.48 * 0.14 0.53 * 0.32 * 0.54 * 0.27 **
3.27 1.54 3.89 0.90 4.98 2.67 4.57 2.21
Hausman test statstics (HT) 6.65 48.60 29.35 51.72 4.46 35.25 28.43 41.42
HT (p-value) 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00
Likelihood ratio test (LR) 2144.42 2158.34 1953.21 1964.86 2136.64 2159.16 1898.83 1909.17
LR (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
number of observations 807 807 807 807 807 807 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842
SIZE 2.03 * 2.19 * 1.82 * 2.50 * 1.78 * 2.30 * 1.34 * 2.60 * 2.17 * 2.28 * 1.96 * 1.58 ** 1.85 * 2.37 * 1.43 * 1.72 **
13.67 9.67 7.78 3.32 8.29 7.97 4.08 3.38 15.42 10.94 7.99 2.31 9.41 9.31 4.24 2.48
SIMILAR 0.66 * 0.75 * 0.58 * 0.83 * 0.62 * 0.77 * 0.48 * 0.84 * 0.35 0.05 0.20 -0.32 0.24 0.08 -0.03 -0.27
4.25 4.31 3.28 4.13 3.92 4.37 2.63 4.16 1.37 0.15 0.71 -0.72 0.91 0.23 -0.09 -0.62
REL -0.15 -0.13 -0.21 -0.17 -0.15 -0.12 -0.20 -0.17 2.39 * 2.84 * 2.36 * 2.87 2.49 * 2.83 * 2.48 * 2.86 *
-0.80 -0.64 -1.09 -0.84 -0.79 -0.61 -1.07 -0.84 8.56 9.12 8.39 9.22 * 8.83 9.13 8.68 9.22
ln(TRADEVOL) 0.19 -0.10 0.27 ** -0.12 0.26 ** -0.08 0.30 ** -0.18
1.69 *** -0.63 2.12 0.65 2.39 -0.58 2.38 -1.06
Hausman test statstics (HT) 7.58 20.62 47.44 44.93 16.13 21.56 54.26 50.91
HT (p-value) 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Likelihood ratio test (LR) 2223.49 2230.69 1835.14 1842.43 2417.68 2422.69 1892.43 1898.62
LR (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
number of observations 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877
Model 3
One-way 
random 
effect
One-way 
random 
effects with 
time 
dummies
Credit market proxies for SIMILAR and REL GDP proxies for SIMILAR and REL
One-way 
random 
effect
One-way fixed 
effects
One-way fixed 
effects
One-way 
random 
effects with 
time 
dummies
Panel B: Cross-border deposits
Model 1
One-way 
random 
effect
One-way fixed 
effects
One-way 
random 
effects with 
time 
dummies
Two-way fixed 
effects
Note: In each regression, the dependent variable is the log of cross-border loan or deposit volume. For each coefficient, the first row shows the estimated coefficient and the second row the t-statistic. Random effects models are estimated with constant, not shown. Fixed effects
estimation with White-robust standard errors. The subscript ED indicates a variable measured as an Euclidean distance where larger values indicate larger differences between bank country and customer country.*, **, and *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively. Hausman test examines the equivalence of the random and fixed effects estimates. If the null hypothesis has to be rejected fixed effects estimation is appropriate. Likelihood ratio test examines significant fixed effects. A rejection of the null hypothesis suggests
significant fixed effects. 
Model 4
One-way 
random 
effect
One-way fixed 
effects
One-way 
random 
effects with 
time 
dummies
Two-way fixed 
effects
Two-way fixed 
effects
Two-way fixed 
effects
Panel A: Cross-border loans
Model 2 
GDP 
proxies 
for 
SIMILAR 
and REL
credit 
market 
proxies 
for 
SIMILAR 
and REL
deposit 
market 
proxies 
for 
SIMILAR 
and REL
money 
proxies 
for 
SIMILAR 
and REL
GDP 
proxies 
for 
SIMILAR 
and REL
credit 
market 
proxies 
for 
SIMILAR 
and REL
deposit 
market 
proxies 
for 
SIMILAR 
and REL
money 
proxies 
for 
SIMILAR 
and REL
Panel A: Cross-border loans
constant 12.84 3.07 8.17 8.13
2.18 1.15 2.17 2.00
SIZE 0.56 0.83 0.56 0.44 0.48 0.66 0.30 0.70 0.84 0.68 0.69 0.76 -0.45 1.32 -0.07 -0.04
0.81 1.18 0.81 0.64 0.43 1.74 0.29 1.67 0.86 1.88 0.69 2.14 -0.42 2.90 -0.12 -0.06
SIMILAR -0.45 -0.20 -0.45 -0.50 0.22 1.29 0.06 0.52 0.60 1.07 0.60 1.02 -0.24 0.54 -0.24 -0.21
-1.44 -0.92 -1.44 -1.49 0.31 1.77 0.18 2.20 1.18 3.22 1.19 2.96 -0.44 2.38 -0.73 -0.60
REL 0.63 -0.07 0.63 1.02 0.75 1.14 -0.10 -0.08 -0.21 0.40 -0.01 0.38 0.75 0.43 1.31 1.29
1.51 -0.33 1.51 1.98 1.53 2.02 -0.35 -0.24 -0.07 1.40 -0.04 1.15 2.60 2.00 4.48 4.09
ln(DISTANCE) -0.65 -0.59 -0.48 -0.48
-6.19 -6.44 -4.96 -4.90
BORDERD 0.53 0.54 0.71 0.70
5.48 5.79 7.27 7.10
ln(BILOANSt-1) 0.37 0.57 0.40 0.62 0.43 0.62 0.42 0.60
3.37 6.19 3.69 6.56 4.03 7.32 4.03 7.17
countrybank dummies No No No No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
countrycustomer dummies No No No No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sargan test 22.17 33.06 19.86 28.62 22.45 25.78 21.94 25.58
p-value 0.33 0.03 0.47 0.10 0.32 0.17 0.34 0.18
m2 -0.71 -0.72 -0.83 -0.89 -0.80 -0.89 -0.80 -0.89
p-value 0.48 0.47 0.41 0.37 0.42 0.37 0.42 0.38
adjusted R2 0.930 0.938 0.938 0.938 0.830 0.830 0.834 0.833
number of observations 842 807 807 807 618 618 603 603 603 603 603 603 842 807 807 807
Fixed effects
Table A3: Baseline model selection using different definitions of size, similarity and absolute differences in factor endowments 
LSDV
GDP proxies 
for SIMILAR 
and REL
credit market 
proxies for 
SIMILAR and 
REL
deposit market 
proxies for 
SIMILAR and 
REL
money proxies 
for SIMILAR 
and REL
Dynamic
GDP 
proxies 
for 
SIMILAR 
and REL
credit 
market 
proxies 
for 
SIMILAR 
and REL
deposit 
market 
proxies 
for 
SIMILAR 
and REL
money 
proxies 
for 
SIMILAR 
and REL
GDP 
proxies 
for 
SIMILAR 
and REL
credit 
market 
proxies 
for 
SIMILAR 
and REL
deposit 
market 
proxies 
for 
SIMILAR 
and REL
money 
proxies 
for 
SIMILAR 
and REL
Fixed effects
Table A3: Baseline model selection using different definitions of size, similarity and absolute differences in factor endowments 
LSDV
GDP proxies 
for SIMILAR 
and REL
credit market 
proxies for 
SIMILAR and 
REL
deposit market 
proxies for 
SIMILAR and 
REL
money proxies 
for SIMILAR 
and REL
Dynamic
Panel B: Cross-border deposits
constant 2.96 1.92 16.01 16.06
0.44 0.78 5.26 4.94
SIZE 1.58 2.50 2.01 2.13 1.20 1.21 0.51 0.73 0.36 0.84 0.16 0.82 1.60 1.81 -0.88 -0.91
2.31 3.32 2.53 2.72 0.95 2.14 0.33 1.39 0.23 1.39 0.11 1.41 1.30 4.40 -1.82 -1.72
SIMILAR -0.32 0.83 1.03 1.28 -0.01 -0.19 0.42 0.62 0.60 0.72 0.64 0.69 0.64 0.71 -0.75 -0.76
-0.72 4.13 3.28 3.91 -0.02 -0.32 1.36 2.64 1.26 2.17 1.35 2.00 1.02 3.71 -2.76 -2.58
REL 2.87 -0.17 0.25 0.31 1.20 1.65 0.00 0.10 -0.12 0.30 0.06 0.46 0.88 -0.33 0.43 0.48
9.22 -0.84 0.76 0.83 2.04 2.83 0.01 0.42 -0.32 0.82 0.14 1.22 4.03 -1.91 2.18 2.27
ln(DISTANCE) -0.84 -0.75 -0.69 -0.68
-8.17 -7.38 -6.96 -6.88
BORDERD 0.56 0.64 0.73 0.73
4.99 5.61 6.50 6.46
ln(BIDEPOSITSt-1) 0.45 0.42 0.32 0.39 0.32 0.37 0.33 0.37
2.41 1.98 1.55 1.72 1.60 1.58 1.61 1.57
countrybank dummies No No No No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
countrycustomer dummies No No No No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sargan test 30.35 25.24 27.20 24.05 27.61 24.52 28.42 24.24
p-value 0.06 0.19 0.13 0.24 0.12 0.22 0.10 0.23
m2 -1.22 -1.22 -1.14 -1.16 -1.13 -1.14 -1.14 -1.15
p-value 0.22 0.22 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.25
adjusted R2 0.950 0.944 0.944 0.944 0.835 0.834 0.833 0.832
number of observations 877 839 839 839 655 655 637 637 637 637 637 637 877 839 839 839
Note: In each regression, the dependent variable is the log of bilateral cross-border loan or deposit volume. The two-way fixed effects model is estimated with White-robust standard errors.
The dynamic model uses the Arellano-Bond (1991) 2-step generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator. The difference of the lagged dependent variable and its lags as well as the
exogonous variables are used as instruments. For each coefficient, the first row shows the estimated coefficient and the second row the t- or z-statistic. Sargan test examines the
overidentifying restrictions. If the null hypothesis is not rejected the instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the error term and therefore valid. The Arellano-Bond test (m2) examines the
hypothesis that there is no second-order autocorrelation in the residuals. The Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) model is estimated as OLS with White-robust standard errors. For each
coefficient, the first row shows the estimated coefficient and the second row the t-statistic. The subscript D indicates a dummy variable.
Table A4: LSDV model selection
Panel A1: Cross-border loans
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 4 Reg 5 Reg 6 Reg 7 Reg 8 Reg 9 Reg 10 Reg 11 Reg 12 Reg 13 Reg 14 Reg 15 Reg 16 Reg 17 Reg 18 Reg 19 Reg 20 Reg 21 Reg 22 Reg 23
constant 3.07 3.27 3.82 3.46 2.88 1.71 2.00 1.56 3.47 2.38 3.00 2.99 3.27 2.63 1.95 4.27 3.08 1.93 2.81 3.25 4.99 3.97 5.09
1.15 1.22 1.42 1.32 1.07 0.61 0.73 0.56 1.32 0.90 1.09 1.11 1.20 0.95 0.71 1.60 1.15 0.70 1.07 1.28 1.90 1.51 2.00
SIZE 1.32 1.31 1.31 1.18 1.32 1.57 1.56 1.65 1.34 1.20 1.32 1.32 1.31 1.39 1.49 1.15 1.32 1.31 1.24 1.09 0.86 0.97 0.84
2.90 2.89 2.90 2.66 2.90 3.33 3.32 3.49 3.00 2.71 2.87 2.90 2.87 2.95 3.17 2.52 2.91 2.79 2.82 2.54 1.93 2.19 1.97
SIMILAR_CRE 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.56 0.55 0.67 0.67 0.71 0.62 0.52 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.57 0.61 0.46 0.54 0.57 0.59 0.61 0.52 0.57 0.51
2.38 2.38 2.39 2.46 2.42 2.80 2.83 2.99 2.76 2.32 2.36 2.38 2.37 2.43 2.60 2.05 2.38 2.41 2.64 2.74 2.28 2.52 2.31
REL_CRE 0.43 0.42 0.40 0.54 0.43 0.44 0.41 0.43 0.39 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.45 0.43 0.43 0.40 0.52 0.54 0.51 0.54
2.00 1.94 1.87 2.40 2.01 2.04 1.89 1.99 1.85 2.00 2.00 2.01 2.05 2.02 2.01 2.08 1.98 2.02 1.88 2.35 2.45 2.33 2.45
ln(DISTANCE) -0.59 -0.60 -0.60 -0.58 -0.56 -0.58 -0.61 -0.60 -0.66 -0.47 -0.59 -0.58 -0.61 -0.59 -0.58 -0.60 -0.60 -0.47 -0.55 -0.54 -0.56 -0.54 -0.56
-6.44 -6.47 -6.52 -6.27 -5.44 -6.30 -6.58 -6.55 -7.27 -4.90 -6.42 -6.45 -6.65 -6.41 -6.32 -6.74 -6.42 -4.97 -5.74 -5.60 -6.12 -5.73 -6.10
BORDERD 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.52 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.56 0.54 0.50 0.48 0.46 0.48 0.47 0.48
5.79 5.77 5.74 5.63 5.53 5.22 5.06 5.13 5.24 5.95 5.82 5.75 5.68 5.61 5.62 5.95 5.75 5.71 5.48 5.27 5.46 5.27 5.46
ln(FRGBNKbank country) -0.05
-0.67
ln(FRGBNKcustomer country) -0.14
-1.80 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13
ln(FRGBNKED) 0.11 3.34 3.41 3.29 3.40
2.79
LANGUAGED 0.11
0.71
ln(CULTUREED) -0.34 -0.13
-3.30 -1.19
ln(TRUST&CULTURE3) -0.33
-3.10
ln(TRUST&CULTURE4) -0.39
-3.89
ln(TRUSTED) -0.24 -0.20 -0.20 -0.24 -0.22 -0.24
-5.08 -4.32 -4.50 -4.75 -4.37 -5.11
LEGALFAMD 0.66 0.61 0.56 0.56 0.54 0.59 0.55
6.27 5.65 5.42 5.49 5.13 5.51 5.37
ln(POLED) -0.01
-0.16
ln(CORRUPED) -0.01
-0.47
ln(GOVEFFED) 0.03
0.81
ln(POLSTABED) -0.03
-0.88
ln(REGQALED) -0.06 -0.01 0.04
-1.75 -0.19 1.01
ln(VOICEED) 0.09 0.14 0.14
2.50 3.68 3.73
ln(LAWED) 0.00
0.07
countrylender dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
countryborrower dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
adjusted R2 0.830 0.830 0.830 0.831 0.830 0.831 0.831 0.832 0.835 0.836 0.830 0.830 0.830 0.830 0.830 0.831 0.830 0.836 0.839 0.841 0.844 0.841 0.844
number of observations 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807
Note: In each regression, the dependent variable is the log of bilateral cross-border loan volume. The Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) model is estimated as OLS with White-robust standard errors. For each coefficient, the first row shows the estimated
coefficient and the second row the t-statistic. The subscript D indicates a dummy variable and the subscript ED a variable measured as an Euclidean distance where larger values indicate larger differences between borrower and lender country. 
Table A4: LSDV model selection
Panel A2: Cross-border loans
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 4 Reg 5 Reg 6 Reg 7 Reg 8 Reg 9 Reg 10 Reg 11 Reg 12 Reg 13 Reg 14 Reg 15 Reg 16 Reg 17 Reg 18 Reg 19 Reg 20 Reg 21 Reg 22 Reg 23
constant 12.84 13.94 14.71 11.76 12.81 13.20 13.31 13.39 13.23 11.70 12.81 12.84 13.15 12.86 12.70 13.70 13.02 11.92 12.20 10.87 12.26 11.25 12.22
2.18 2.32 2.52 2.02 2.17 2.26 2.28 2.30 2.33 2.07 2.18 2.18 2.23 2.18 2.16 2.38 2.21 2.11 2.20 1.99 2.34 2.09 2.33
SIZE -0.45 -0.61 -0.66 -0.29 -0.45 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.42 -0.46 -0.42 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.44 -0.54 -0.46 -0.48 -0.44 -0.24 -0.36 -0.27 -0.36
-0.42 -0.56 -0.62 -0.27 -0.42 -0.46 -0.46 -0.46 -0.41 -0.45 -0.39 -0.42 -0.42 -0.42 -0.41 -0.51 -0.43 -0.47 -0.44 -0.24 -0.38 -0.28 -0.38
SIMILAR_GDP -0.24 -0.32 -0.35 -0.09 -0.24 -0.25 -0.24 -0.24 -0.15 -0.21 -0.22 -0.24 -0.24 -0.24 -0.23 -0.29 -0.24 -0.21 -0.14 0.05 -0.02 0.04 -0.02
-0.44 -0.58 -0.65 -0.16 -0.44 -0.46 -0.45 -0.45 -0.29 -0.40 -0.41 -0.44 -0.44 -0.44 -0.44 -0.55 -0.44 -0.41 -0.28 0.09 -0.04 0.09 -0.04
REL_GDP 0.75 0.73 0.72 0.80 0.74 0.95 0.86 0.93 0.73 0.80 0.68 0.75 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.58 0.72 0.87 0.77 0.84 0.58 0.70 0.59
2.60 2.54 2.51 2.73 2.54 3.30 2.98 3.22 2.60 2.79 2.32 2.59 2.40 2.56 2.75 2.12 2.46 3.05 2.77 2.95 2.19 2.51 2.27
ln(DISTANCE) -0.65 -0.65 -0.65 -0.66 -0.65 -0.67 -0.68 -0.69 -0.73 -0.55 -0.67 -0.65 -0.68 -0.65 -0.65 -0.65 -0.66 -0.57 -0.63 -0.63 -0.65 -0.63 -0.65
-6.19 -6.20 -6.19 -6.24 -5.32 -6.41 -6.46 -6.54 -6.89 -5.16 -6.59 -6.33 -6.62 -6.11 -6.12 -6.49 -6.53 -5.32 -5.82 -5.89 -6.42 -5.99 -6.43
BORDERD 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.51 0.52 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.49 0.53 0.53 0.51 0.53 0.52 0.55 0.53 0.47 0.46 0.43 0.45 0.44 0.45
5.48 5.49 5.49 5.25 5.39 4.78 4.74 4.74 4.99 5.39 5.49 5.42 5.35 5.31 5.31 5.75 5.42 5.14 5.03 4.71 5.03 4.77 5.04
ln(FRGBNKbank country) -0.09
-1.14
ln(FRGBNKcustomer country) -0.15
-1.99
ln(FRGBNKED) 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
2.16 2.84 2.66 2.67 2.69
LANGUAGED 0.02
0.12
ln(CULTUREED) -0.35 -0.14
-3.69 -1.40
ln(CULT3_TRUSTED) -0.32
-3.26
ln(CULT4_TRUSTED) -0.38
-4.00
ln(TRUSTED) -0.23 -0.19 -0.20 -0.25 -0.23 -0.24
-5.27 -4.42 -4.58 -5.15 -4.69 -5.46
LEGALFAMD 0.67 0.62 0.57 0.58 0.56 0.62 0.56
6.46 5.78 5.55 5.64 5.35 5.82 5.44
ln(POLED) 0.06
0.76
ln(CORRUPED) 0.00
-0.11
ln(GOVEFFED) 0.05
1.36
ln(POLSTABED) 0.00
-0.08
ln(REGQALED) -0.03 0.02 0.08
-0.84 0.37 1.87
ln(VOICEED) 0.12 0.16 0.16
3.40 4.37 4.67
ln(LAWED) 0.02
0.55
countrylender dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
countryborrower dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
adjusted R2 0.830 0.830 0.831 0.831 0.830 0.832 0.831 0.832 0.835 0.836 0.830 0.830 0.830 0.830 0.830 0.832 0.830 0.836 0.839 0.841 0.844 0.841 0.844
number of observations 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842
Table A4: LSDV model selection
Panel B1: Cross-border deposits
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 4 Reg 5 Reg 6 Reg 7 Reg 8 Reg 9 Reg 10 Reg 11 Reg 12 Reg 13 Reg 14 Reg 15 Reg 16 Reg 17 Reg 18 Reg 19 Reg 20 Reg 21 Reg 22 Reg 23 Reg 24 Reg 25 Reg 26 Reg 27 Reg 28 Reg 29 Reg 30
constant 1.92 2.24 2.14 1.48 1.71 1.58 1.72 1.29 2.30 0.96 2.08 1.86 1.97 2.84 0.73 2.27 1.98 -0.90 7.83 3.12 2.86 2.68 1.94 2.58 0.38 1.25 2.67 2.63 -3.55 1.96
0.78 0.90 0.88 0.60 0.69 0.62 0.68 0.51 0.95 0.41 0.83 0.76 0.79 1.13 0.29 0.92 0.81 -0.10 0.66 1.00 1.15 0.96 0.79 1.15 0.13 0.47 1.11 1.11 -1.00 0.76
SIZE 1.81 1.80 1.80 1.94 1.77 1.87 1.85 1.94 1.83 1.72 1.79 1.81 1.81 1.66 1.99 1.76 1.82 1.81 1.83 1.42 1.71 1.83 1.80 1.81 1.81 1.81 1.56 1.57 1.98 1.57
4.40 4.39 4.41 4.63 4.31 4.41 4.33 4.56 4.54 4.33 4.33 4.41 4.38 3.96 4.80 4.27 4.42 4.41 4.45 2.66 4.20 4.42 4.38 4.40 4.40 4.40 3.90 3.91 3.35 3.91
SIMILAR_CRE 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.71 0.74 0.73 0.78 0.79 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.65 0.78 0.68 0.72 0.71 0.72 0.33 0.67 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.64 0.65 0.72 0.65
3.71 3.71 3.71 3.67 3.74 3.70 3.65 3.87 4.18 3.79 3.64 3.71 3.70 3.39 4.01 3.56 3.74 3.71 3.76 1.45 3.52 3.73 3.68 3.71 3.71 3.71 3.54 3.57 2.81 3.57
REL_CRE -0.33 -0.35 -0.35 -0.43 -0.34 -0.33 -0.34 -0.34 -0.37 -0.36 -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 -0.34 -0.33 -0.33 -0.34 -0.33 -0.33 0.58 -0.35 -0.32 -0.34 -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 -0.51 -0.50 -0.27 -0.50
-1.91 -2.00 -2.01 -2.42 -1.95 -1.93 -1.95 -1.96 -2.16 -2.13 -1.92 -1.91 -1.89 -1.98 -1.89 -1.90 -1.95 -1.92 -1.90 2.53 -2.06 -1.83 -1.93 -1.91 -1.91 -1.91 -2.93 -2.93 -1.21 -2.93
ln(DISTANCE) -0.75 -0.75 -0.75 -0.75 -0.69 -0.75 -0.75 -0.75 -0.82 -0.61 -0.76 -0.75 -0.75 -0.75 -0.74 -0.75 -0.77 -0.75 -0.75 -0.32 -0.75 -0.75 -0.75 -0.75 -0.75 -0.75 -0.68 -0.68 -0.06 -0.68
-7.38 -7.42 -7.43 -7.42 -6.40 -7.30 -7.39 -7.39 -8.02 -5.97 -7.28 -7.28 -7.42 -7.44 -7.12 -7.46 -7.22 -7.39 -7.38 -2.77 -7.40 -7.38 -7.37 -7.38 -7.38 -7.38 -6.45 -6.53 -0.54 -6.53
BORDERD 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.66 0.59 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.59 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.65 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.80 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.82 0.63
5.61 5.60 5.60 5.76 4.96 5.48 5.47 5.40 5.21 5.83 5.61 5.57 5.56 5.70 5.56 5.65 5.63 5.61 5.61 5.76 5.59 5.64 5.54 5.61 5.61 5.61 5.87 5.87 6.20 5.87
ln(FRGBNKbank country) -0.06
-0.81
ln(FRGBNKcustomer country) -0.06
-0.96
ln(FRGBNKED) -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.03 -0.09
-2.71 -2.57 -2.56 -0.79 -2.56
LANGUAGED 0.24
1.44
ln(CULTUREED) -0.07
-0.70
ln(CULT3_TRUSTED) -0.05
-0.52
ln(CULT4_TRUSTED) -0.15
-1.42
ln(TRUSTED) -0.22 -0.18 -0.18 -0.22 -0.18
-5.13 -3.83 -4.01 -4.07 -4.01
LEGALFAMD 0.74 0.71 0.71 1.47 0.71
7.12 6.48 6.45 6.25 6.45
ln(POLED) 0.03
0.38
ln(CORRUPED) -0.01
-0.27
ln(GOVEFFED) 0.01
0.21
ln(POLSTABED) 0.06 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11
1.81 3.55 3.76 3.57 3.76
ln(REGQALED) -0.07 0.00
-1.74 0.08
ln(VOICEED) 0.03
0.78
ln(LAWED) 0.03
0.64
ln(COVERAGEbank country) 0.28
0.33
ln(COVERAGEcustomer country) -0.61
-0.52
ln(COVERAGEED) -0.29 -0.17
-3.44 -1.96
ln(COVRATIObank country) -0.81
-1.37
ln(COVRATIOcustomer country) 0.29
0.55
ln(COVRATIOED) 0.01
0.23
DEPINSD, bank country -0.67
-2.63
DEPINSD, customer country 1.54
3.33
DEPINSURE 1.33 1.33
2.63 2.69
countrylender dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
countryborrower dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
adjusted R2 0.834 0.834 0.834 0.835 0.834 0.834 0.834 0.834 0.839 0.841 0.834 0.834 0.834 0.834 0.834 0.834 0.834 0.834 0.834 0.858 0.834 0.834 0.834 0.834 0.834 0.834 0.847 0.847 0.872 0.847
number of observations 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 480 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 480 839
Table A4: LSDV model selection
Panel B2: Cross-border deposits
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 4 Reg 5 Reg 6 Reg 7 Reg 8 Reg 9 Reg 10 Reg 11 Reg 12 Reg 13 Reg 14 Reg 15 Reg 16 Reg 17 Reg 18 Reg 19 Reg 20 Reg 21 Reg 22 Reg 23 Reg 24 Reg 25 Reg 26 Reg 27 Reg 28 Reg 29 Reg 30
constant 2.96 3.29 3.37 3.81 2.84 3.14 3.08 3.30 3.46 1.69 2.98 2.94 2.96 2.61 2.53 3.20 2.78 7.42 8.01 7.83 5.29 2.08 3.06 3.68 2.04 2.25 1.99 2.11 3.37 1.32
0.44 0.48 0.50 0.57 0.42 0.47 0.46 0.49 0.54 0.25 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.39 0.38 0.48 0.41 0.70 0.62 0.90 0.76 0.31 0.45 0.60 0.25 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.40 0.19
SIZE 1.60 1.56 1.54 1.47 1.60 1.58 1.59 1.58 1.61 1.58 1.59 1.59 1.60 1.68 1.64 1.58 1.60 1.60 1.69 0.49 1.21 2.02 1.59 1.60 1.60 1.60 1.65 1.63 0.65 1.63
1.30 1.27 1.26 1.21 1.30 1.28 1.30 1.29 1.37 1.30 1.29 1.29 1.30 1.36 1.35 1.28 1.30 1.30 1.38 0.31 0.96 1.57 1.29 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.42 1.41 0.44 1.41
SIMILAR_GDP 0.64 0.62 0.61 0.52 0.65 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.71 0.68 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.69 0.66 0.62 0.64 0.64 0.68 -0.12 0.44 0.85 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.74 0.73 0.13 0.73
1.02 0.98 0.97 0.84 1.03 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.19 1.09 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.10 1.06 0.99 1.02 1.02 1.09 -0.14 0.69 1.29 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.26 1.25 0.17 1.25
REL_GDP 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.87 1.01 0.92 1.03 0.91 0.99 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.81 0.99 0.85 0.91 0.88 0.87 0.00 0.89 0.86 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.86 0.29 0.86
4.03 4.02 4.01 3.99 3.96 4.39 4.14 4.52 4.42 4.54 3.96 4.07 3.96 3.80 4.48 3.97 4.09 4.04 4.01 0.00 4.09 3.98 4.08 4.03 4.03 4.03 4.36 4.32 1.41 4.32
ln(DISTANCE) -0.84 -0.84 -0.84 -0.84 -0.82 -0.86 -0.85 -0.87 -0.92 -0.73 -0.84 -0.83 -0.84 -0.84 -0.84 -0.85 -0.83 -0.84 -0.84 -0.30 -0.84 -0.84 -0.84 -0.84 -0.84 -0.84 -0.78 -0.79 -0.11 -0.79
-8.17 -8.16 -8.16 -8.15 -7.46 -8.28 -8.19 -8.35 -8.85 -7.08 -7.98 -8.03 -8.14 -8.17 -8.05 -8.26 -7.79 -8.18 -8.16 -2.46 -8.22 -8.15 -8.21 -8.17 -8.17 -8.17 -7.37 -7.45 -0.85 -7.45
BORDERD 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.54 0.52 0.54 0.52 0.51 0.54 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.76 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.54 0.54 0.81 0.54
4.99 4.99 4.99 5.13 4.50 4.59 4.70 4.54 4.57 5.04 4.99 4.93 4.97 5.07 4.91 5.04 4.90 4.99 4.99 5.56 5.00 5.00 4.77 4.99 4.99 4.99 5.04 5.03 6.20 5.03
ln(FRGBNKbank country) -0.03
-0.36
ln(FRGBNKcustomer country) -0.04
-0.57
ln(FRGBNKED) -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 -0.05
-2.05 -1.62 -1.65 0.20 -1.65
LANGUAGED 0.07
0.41
ln(CULTUREED) -0.19
-1.67
ln(CULT3_TRUSTED) -0.09
-0.83
ln(CULT4_TRUSTED) -0.23
-2.09
ln(TRUSTED) -0.22 -0.16 -0.17 -0.16 -0.17
-5.06 -3.56 -3.93 -3.59 -3.93
LEGALFAMD 0.78 0.74 0.75 1.40 0.75
7.74 6.78 6.82 6.36 6.82
ln(POLED) -0.02
-0.30
ln(CORRUPED) -0.02
-0.63
ln(GOVEFFED) 0.00
-0.04
ln(POLSTABED) 0.05 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.10
1.74 3.63 3.70 3.86 3.70
ln(REGQALED) -0.08 -0.01
-2.30 -0.37
ln(VOICEED) 0.03
1.00
ln(LAWED) -0.03
-0.77
ln(COVERAGEbank country) -0.44
-0.51
ln(COVERAGEcustomer country) -0.56
-0.48
ln(COVERAGEED) -0.23 -0.11
-2.80 -1.29
ln(COVRATIObank country) -0.40
-0.92
ln(COVRATIOcustomer country) 0.45
1.11
ln(COVRATIOED) -0.01
-0.31
DEPINSD, bank country -0.71
-1.11
DEPINSD, customer country 0.93
0.61
DEPINSURE 1.43 1.57
1.11 1.29
countrylender dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
countryborrower dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
adjusted R2 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.836 0.835 0.836 0.835 0.836 0.840 0.843 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.836 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.863 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.847 0.847 0.878 0.847
number of observations 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 496 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 496 877
Table A5: Robustness check for LSDV model selection
Panel A1: Cross-border loans
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 6 Reg 7 Reg 4 Reg 5 Reg 8 Reg 9 Reg 10 Reg 11 Reg 12 Reg 13 Reg 14 Reg 15 Reg 16 Reg 17 Reg 18 Reg 19 Reg 20 Reg 21 Reg 22 Reg 23
constant -3.03 -2.82 -2.30 -2.72 -3.03 -3.89 -3.30 -3.66 -1.44 -2.57 -2.81 -3.12 -2.89 -3.17 -3.26 -1.86 -3.18 -2.95 -1.27 -0.88 1.06 -0.06 0.98
-1.05 -0.97 -0.80 -0.97 -1.06 -1.33 -1.14 -1.26 -0.49 -0.90 -0.98 -1.09 -1.00 -1.09 -1.13 -0.65 -1.11 -1.00 -0.44 -0.31 0.37 -0.02 0.35
SIZE 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.84 0.98 1.21 1.15 1.25 1.07 0.95 0.91 0.96 0.96 1.01 1.05 0.79 1.01 1.04 1.02 0.87 0.61 0.71 0.63
2.24 2.23 2.24 1.94 2.24 2.60 2.46 2.66 2.42 2.18 2.00 2.16 2.17 2.20 2.22 1.77 2.30 2.26 2.34 2.03 1.34 1.56 1.46
SIMILAR_CRE 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.43 0.41 0.52 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.42 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.44 0.32 0.43 0.46 0.49 0.51 0.41 0.46 0.41
1.84 1.84 1.85 1.92 1.84 2.19 2.06 2.27 2.18 1.86 1.67 1.76 1.81 1.83 1.84 1.43 1.94 1.95 2.15 2.24 1.73 1.93 1.82
REL_CRE 0.33 0.31 0.30 0.45 0.33 0.34 0.32 0.34 0.32 0.34 0.32 0.32 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.31 0.35 0.34 0.46 0.47 0.45 0.48
1.50 1.44 1.38 1.94 1.50 1.55 1.47 1.52 1.49 1.57 1.43 1.44 1.56 1.50 1.51 1.58 1.37 1.59 1.55 2.03 2.12 1.99 2.13
ln(DISTANCE) -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.06 -0.08 -0.09 -0.12 -0.13 -0.24 -0.07 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.10 -0.07 -0.21 -0.19 -0.22 -0.18 -0.22
-0.56 -0.59 -0.64 -0.43 -0.55 -0.64 -0.80 -0.87 -1.56 -0.47 -0.61 -0.54 -0.65 -0.58 -0.59 -0.56 -0.68 -0.51 -1.35 -1.26 -1.49 -1.24 -1.51
BORDERD 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.30 0.32 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.28 0.30 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.30 0.32
2.54 2.52 2.52 2.42 2.58 2.30 2.40 2.38 2.70 2.86 2.40 2.45 2.24 2.52 2.55 2.67 2.50 2.74 2.98 2.85 3.03 2.84 3.04
ln(FRGBNKbank country) -0.06
-0.75
ln(FRGBNKcustomer country) -0.12
-1.66 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
ln(FRGBNKED) 0.12 3.44 3.49 3.37 3.51
3.11
LANGUAGED 0.00
0.03
ln(CULTUREED) -0.28 -0.11
-2.70 -1.08
ln(TRUST&CULTURE3,ED) -0.19
-1.77
ln(TRUST&CULTURE4,ED) -0.29
-2.74
ln(TRUSTED) -0.18 -0.15 -0.16 -0.20 -0.18 -0.19
-3.40 -3.02 -3.16 -3.68 -3.31 -3.78
LEGALFAMD 0.54 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.53 0.48
4.84 4.46 4.52 4.59 4.44 4.76 4.49
ln(POLED) 0.09
1.11
ln(CORRUPED) 0.04
1.30
ln(GOVEFFED) 0.06
1.55
ln(POLSTABED) -0.01
-0.33
ln(REGQALED) -0.02 0.01 0.06
-0.54 0.18 1.33
ln(VOICEED) 0.10 0.14 0.14
2.84 3.50 3.68
ln(LAWED) 0.05
1.23
ln(TRADEVOL) 0.66 0.66 0.65 0.67 0.66 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.52 0.55 0.69 0.70 0.68 0.65 0.64 0.67 0.69 0.54 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.44
4.02 4.04 3.99 4.19 3.97 3.86 3.69 3.66 3.05 3.32 3.98 4.00 4.10 3.96 3.74 4.14 4.04 3.31 2.59 2.70 2.72 2.79 2.74
countrylender dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
countryborrower dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
adjusted R2 0.836 0.836 0.836 0.838 0.836 0.837 0.836 0.837 0.839 0.840 0.836 0.836 0.836 0.836 0.836 0.837 0.836 0.840 0.842 0.844 0.846 0.844 0.846
number of observations 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807
See notes to table A4.
Table A5: Robustness check for LSDV model selection
Panel A2: Cross-border loans
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 6 Reg 7 Reg 4 Reg 5 Reg 8 Reg 9 Reg 10 Reg 11 Reg 12 Reg 13 Reg 14 Reg 15 Reg 16 Reg 17 Reg 18 Reg 19 Reg 20 Reg 21 Reg 22 Reg 23
constant 10.27 11.49 12.07 8.90 10.37 10.66 10.79 10.91 11.20 9.80 9.95 10.18 10.55 10.18 10.27 11.07 10.58 10.02 10.64 9.13 10.49 9.46 10.46
1.69 1.85 2.00 1.48 1.70 1.76 1.78 1.80 1.89 1.67 1.63 1.67 1.73 1.66 1.69 1.86 1.75 1.71 1.84 1.61 1.93 1.70 1.92
SIZE -1.08 -1.27 -1.28 -0.92 -1.09 -1.11 -1.07 -1.07 -0.91 -0.96 -1.06 -1.10 -1.13 -1.07 -1.08 -1.21 -1.14 -0.98 -0.83 -0.65 -0.79 -0.71 -0.78
-1.07 -1.24 -1.27 -0.92 -1.08 -1.11 -1.06 -1.07 -0.92 -0.98 -1.05 -1.09 -1.11 -1.05 -1.07 -1.22 -1.13 -1.00 -0.86 -0.68 -0.86 -0.75 -0.84
SIMILAR_GDP -0.52 -0.61 -0.62 -0.36 -0.53 -0.52 -0.50 -0.50 -0.38 -0.43 -0.50 -0.52 -0.54 -0.51 -0.52 -0.59 -0.54 -0.44 -0.33 -0.14 -0.21 -0.15 -0.21
-1.02 -1.19 -1.22 -0.70 -1.03 -1.03 -0.99 -0.99 -0.76 -0.87 -0.98 -1.04 -1.05 -0.99 -1.02 -1.18 -1.07 -0.89 -0.67 -0.29 -0.45 -0.32 -0.45
REL_GDP 0.81 0.79 0.77 0.87 0.82 0.99 0.89 0.96 0.78 0.84 0.66 0.78 0.74 0.79 0.81 0.62 0.72 0.92 0.81 0.88 0.60 0.73 0.63
2.76 2.70 2.68 2.90 2.75 3.45 3.07 3.31 2.74 2.90 2.21 2.64 2.50 2.64 2.73 2.26 2.43 3.21 2.87 3.06 2.28 2.58 2.40
ln(DISTANCE) -0.27 -0.27 -0.27 -0.26 -0.29 -0.30 -0.32 -0.33 -0.42 -0.26 -0.27 -0.27 -0.28 -0.27 -0.27 -0.25 -0.28 -0.28 -0.39 -0.38 -0.39 -0.37 -0.40
-1.70 -1.67 -1.69 -1.64 -1.74 -1.87 -1.96 -2.04 -2.57 -1.71 -1.69 -1.67 -1.78 -1.64 -1.63 -1.60 -1.77 -1.80 -2.45 -2.44 -2.59 -2.36 -2.63
BORDERD 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.31 0.35 0.28 0.30 0.29 0.34 0.35 0.32 0.33 0.29 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.33 0.32 0.34 0.31 0.33 0.31 0.33
2.85 2.84 2.88 2.61 2.98 2.37 2.55 2.50 2.97 3.08 2.73 2.80 2.50 2.84 2.85 3.03 2.84 2.81 3.17 2.88 3.14 2.93 3.15
ln(FRGBNKbank country) -0.10
-1.34
ln(FRGBNKcustomer country) -0.15
-1.92 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10
ln(FRGBNKED) 0.10 3.06 2.86 2.87 2.91
2.60
LANGUAGED -0.07
-0.45
ln(CULTUREED) -0.33 -0.15
-3.59 -1.62
ln(TRUST&CULTURE3,ED) -0.25
-2.55
ln(TRUST&CULTURE4,ED) -0.33
-3.45
ln(TRUSTED) -0.20 -0.16 -0.17 -0.22 -0.20 -0.22
-3.94 -3.47 -3.61 -4.38 -3.93 -4.49
LEGALFAMD 0.59 0.54 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.57 0.50
5.21 4.56 4.81 4.88 4.71 5.14 4.69
ln(POLED) 0.14
1.71
ln(CORRUPED) 0.04
1.18
ln(GOVEFFED) 0.07
2.01
ln(POLSTABED) 0.01
0.27
ln(REGQALED) 0.00 0.03 0.09
-0.01 0.61 2.09
ln(VOICEED) 0.13 0.16 0.17
3.76 4.32 4.69
ln(LAWED) 0.06
1.45
ln(TRADEVOL) 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.53 0.51 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.39 0.40 0.55 0.53 0.53 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.54 0.40 0.31 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.34
2.93 2.98 2.90 3.11 2.93 2.90 2.75 2.77 2.29 2.36 3.04 2.92 3.05 2.93 2.84 3.11 3.00 2.38 1.89 2.07 2.24 2.23 2.21
countrylender dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
countryborrower dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
adjusted R2 0.834 0.834 0.834 0.835 0.834 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.837 0.838 0.834 0.834 0.835 0.834 0.834 0.836 0.834 0.838 0.841 0.842 0.846 0.843 0.846
number of observations 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842
Table A5: Robustness check for LSDV model selection
Panel B1: Cross-border deposits
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 4 Reg 5 Reg 6 Reg 7 Reg 8 Reg 9 Reg 10 Reg 11 Reg 12 Reg 13 Reg 14 Reg 15 Reg 16 Reg 17 Reg 18 Reg 19 Reg 20 Reg 21 Reg 22 Reg 23 Reg 24 Reg 25 Reg 26 Reg 27 Reg 28 Reg 29 Reg 30
constant -2.68 -2.38 -2.46 -3.05 -2.76 -2.88 -2.66 -2.99 -1.41 -2.47 -2.36 -2.74 -2.57 -1.71 -2.96 -2.23 -2.87 -5.83 6.39 0.01 -1.74 -2.31 -2.64 -1.98 -5.60 -3.37 -0.27 -0.48 -4.23 -1.15
-1.04 -0.91 -0.96 -1.19 -1.06 -1.09 -1.02 -1.14 -0.55 -0.99 -0.91 -1.06 -0.99 -0.66 -1.15 -0.87 -1.11 -0.64 0.57 0.00 -0.67 -0.78 -1.02 -0.83 -1.85 -1.21 -0.11 -0.19 -1.21 -0.43
SIZE 1.43 1.43 1.43 1.56 1.41 1.47 1.42 1.52 1.53 1.43 1.31 1.40 1.41 1.16 1.51 1.33 1.44 1.43 1.45 1.09 1.34 1.44 1.41 1.43 1.43 1.43 1.20 1.25 1.72 1.25
3.46 3.46 3.46 3.71 3.41 3.45 3.29 3.53 3.72 3.58 3.11 3.38 3.38 2.73 3.56 3.18 3.49 3.47 3.52 1.92 3.25 3.46 3.41 3.46 3.46 3.46 2.92 3.05 2.36 3.05
SIMILAR_CRE 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.57 0.59 0.56 0.61 0.66 0.59 0.52 0.55 0.56 0.47 0.60 0.52 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.21 0.53 0.57 0.55 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.50 0.51 0.61 0.51
2.97 2.97 2.97 2.93 2.99 2.94 2.79 3.04 3.48 3.19 2.68 2.88 2.91 2.42 3.03 2.68 3.05 2.98 3.03 0.89 2.77 2.97 2.91 2.97 2.97 2.97 2.68 2.79 1.93 2.79
REL_CRE -0.39 -0.40 -0.41 -0.49 -0.40 -0.39 -0.39 -0.40 -0.41 -0.40 -0.41 -0.40 -0.39 -0.42 -0.39 -0.39 -0.42 -0.39 -0.39 0.56 -0.42 -0.39 -0.40 -0.39 -0.39 -0.39 -0.55 -0.55 -0.23 -0.55
-2.28 -2.35 -2.36 -2.75 -2.30 -2.29 -2.28 -2.31 -2.42 -2.40 -2.36 -2.34 -2.24 -2.41 -2.25 -2.28 -2.40 -2.28 -2.26 2.49 -2.42 -2.25 -2.35 -2.28 -2.28 -2.28 -3.20 -3.19 -0.95 -3.19
ln(DISTANCE) -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 -0.34 -0.29 -0.33 -0.33 -0.34 -0.47 -0.30 -0.33 -0.32 -0.33 -0.29 -0.34 -0.32 -0.34 -0.33 -0.32 -0.04 -0.33 -0.33 -0.32 -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 -0.37 -0.37 0.07 -0.37
-2.53 -2.57 -2.57 -2.60 -2.14 -2.52 -2.52 -2.60 -3.49 -2.38 -2.57 -2.50 -2.60 -2.24 -2.58 -2.44 -2.65 -2.54 -2.47 -0.25 -2.56 -2.53 -2.50 -2.53 -2.53 -2.53 -2.76 -2.77 0.37 -2.77
BORDERD 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.41 0.36 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.41 0.44 0.37 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.62 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.46 0.46 0.75 0.46
3.31 3.30 3.30 3.46 2.98 3.25 3.31 3.24 3.43 3.89 3.12 3.27 3.13 3.27 3.34 3.32 3.30 3.31 3.29 3.93 3.29 3.34 3.37 3.31 3.31 3.31 4.06 4.09 4.58 4.09
ln(FRGBNKbank country) -0.05
-0.71
ln(FRGBNKcustomer country) -0.06
-0.88
ln(FRGBNKED) -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.03 -0.09
-2.64 -2.59 -2.57 -0.79 -2.57
LANGUAGED 0.18
1.16
ln(CULTUREED) -0.05
-0.47
ln(TRUST&CULTURE3,ED) 0.01
0.08
ln(TRUST&CULTURE4,ED) -0.09
-0.92
ln(TRUSTED) -0.19 -0.15 -0.14 -0.19 -0.14
-4.07 -3.22 -3.20 -2.89 -3.20
LEGALFAMD 0.65 0.67 0.66 1.43 0.66
6.09 5.96 5.86 5.64 5.86
ln(POLED) 0.12
1.72
ln(CORRUPED) 0.04
1.13
ln(GOVEFFED) 0.03
0.81
ln(POLSTABED) 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13
2.83 4.05 4.41 3.89 4.41
ln(REGQALED) -0.03 0.02
-0.64 0.47
ln(VOICEED) 0.05
1.46
ln(LAWED) 0.07
1.82
ln(COVERAGEbank country) 0.31
0.36
ln(COVERAGEcustomer country) -0.94
-0.84
ln(COVERAGEED) -0.26 -0.16
-3.02 -1.81
ln(COVRATIObank country) -0.80
-1.33
ln(COVRATIOcustomer country) 0.13
0.26
ln(COVRATIOED) 0.02
0.62
DEPINSD, bank country -0.70
-2.82
DEPINSD, customer country 2.92
5.69
DEPINSURE 1.39 1.35
2.82 2.79
ln(TRADEVOL) 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.55 0.45 0.43 0.62 0.60 0.58 0.62 0.54 0.59 0.61 0.56 0.57 0.40 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.42 0.42 0.18 0.42
5.14 5.15 5.11 5.10 5.11 5.13 5.12 5.05 4.04 3.97 5.36 5.28 5.18 5.61 4.71 5.30 5.44 5.14 5.20 2.29 5.14 5.10 5.16 5.14 5.14 5.14 3.83 3.81 0.81 3.81
countrylender dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
countryborrower dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
adjusted R2 0.838 0.838 0.838 0.839 0.838 0.838 0.838 0.838 0.841 0.844 0.838 0.838 0.838 0.839 0.838 0.838 0.838 0.838 0.838 0.859 0.838 0.838 0.838 0.838 0.838 0.838 0.849 0.849 0.872 0.849
number of observations 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 480 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 480 839
Table A5: LSDV model selection
Panel B2: Cross-border deposits
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 4 Reg 5 Reg 6 Reg 7 Reg 8 Reg 9 Reg 10 Reg 11 Reg 12 Reg 13 Reg 14 Reg 15 Reg 16 Reg 17 Reg 18 Reg 19 Reg 20 Reg 21 Reg 22 Reg 23 Reg 24 Reg 25 Reg 26 Reg 27 Reg 28 Reg 29 Reg 30
constant -0.78 -0.46 -0.38 0.05 -0.81 -0.58 -0.68 -0.39 0.46 -0.87 -1.05 -0.90 -0.74 -1.64 -0.75 -0.59 -0.77 2.78 7.30 4.63 1.52 -1.33 -0.79 -0.08 -2.85 -1.48 -0.48 -0.47 0.91 -1.26
-0.12 -0.07 -0.06 0.01 -0.12 -0.09 -0.10 -0.06 0.07 -0.13 -0.16 -0.13 -0.11 -0.24 -0.11 -0.09 -0.11 0.26 0.58 0.52 0.22 -0.20 -0.12 -0.01 -0.35 -0.20 -0.07 -0.07 0.11 -0.18
SIZE 1.22 1.19 1.17 1.12 1.23 1.21 1.22 1.21 1.31 1.31 1.24 1.22 1.22 1.31 1.28 1.16 1.22 1.23 1.35 0.15 0.84 1.53 1.23 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.41 1.41 0.46 1.41
0.99 0.96 0.94 0.91 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.11 1.07 1.00 0.99 0.98 1.06 1.04 0.94 0.98 0.99 1.11 0.09 0.66 1.17 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.21 1.21 0.31 1.21
SIMILAR_GDP 0.49 0.47 0.46 0.38 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.58 0.56 0.50 0.48 0.48 0.55 0.51 0.45 0.48 0.49 0.55 -0.26 0.29 0.64 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.64 0.64 0.04 0.64
0.77 0.74 0.73 0.62 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.96 0.91 0.79 0.77 0.76 0.87 0.81 0.71 0.77 0.77 0.88 -0.31 0.46 0.96 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 1.09 1.09 0.06 1.09
REL_GDP 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.81 0.95 0.84 0.95 0.86 0.93 0.75 0.80 0.79 0.71 0.89 0.77 0.80 0.82 0.81 -0.10 0.83 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.80 0.79 0.20 0.79
3.57 3.56 3.56 3.55 3.52 3.98 3.64 4.03 3.99 4.14 3.17 3.45 3.38 3.20 3.82 3.43 3.40 3.58 3.52 -0.46 3.63 3.54 3.55 3.57 3.57 3.57 3.86 3.89 0.94 3.89
ln(DISTANCE) -0.47 -0.47 -0.47 -0.47 -0.46 -0.48 -0.47 -0.50 -0.62 -0.47 -0.46 -0.46 -0.47 -0.42 -0.49 -0.45 -0.47 -0.47 -0.46 0.02 -0.47 -0.47 -0.47 -0.47 -0.47 -0.47 -0.54 -0.53 0.13 -0.53
-3.58 -3.58 -3.57 -3.62 -3.35 -3.68 -3.62 -3.79 -4.51 -3.69 -3.54 -3.53 -3.61 -3.26 -3.73 -3.45 -3.58 -3.59 -3.50 0.11 -3.60 -3.62 -3.56 -3.58 -3.58 -3.58 -3.95 -3.94 0.76 -3.94
BORDERD 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.35 0.32 0.34 0.32 0.35 0.39 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.58 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.41 0.41 0.69 0.41
3.02 3.02 3.02 3.16 2.81 2.71 2.89 2.74 3.06 3.53 2.91 3.00 2.85 3.02 3.08 3.01 3.01 3.02 2.99 3.84 3.02 3.04 2.96 3.02 3.02 3.02 3.70 3.71 4.66 3.71
ln(FRGBNKbank country) -0.03
-0.35
ln(FRGBNKcustomer country) -0.03
-0.56
ln(FRGBNKED) -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 0.00 -0.05
-1.80 -1.53 -1.54 0.05 -1.54
LANGUAGED 0.03
0.16
ln(CULTUREED) -0.18
-1.64
ln(CULT3_TRUSTED) -0.05
-0.50
ln(CULT4_TRUSTED) -0.20
-1.83
ln(TRUSTED) -0.19 -0.15 -0.15 -0.13 -0.15
-4.21 -3.17 -3.36 -2.90 -3.36
LEGALFAMD 0.72 0.70 0.70 1.37 0.70
6.79 6.30 6.27 6.05 6.27
ln(POLED) 0.06
0.98
ln(CORRUPED) 0.02
0.69
ln(GOVEFFED) 0.02
0.61
ln(POLSTABED) 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.11
2.59 3.97 4.15 4.29 4.15
ln(REGQALED) -0.05 0.00
-1.35 -0.07
ln(VOICEED) 0.06
1.67
ln(LAWED) 0.01
0.32
ln(COVERAGEbank country) -0.35
-0.41
ln(COVERAGEcustomer country) -0.90
-0.81
ln(COVERAGEED) -0.21 -0.10
-2.57 -1.22
ln(COVRATIObank country) -0.39
-0.88
ln(COVRATIOcustomer country) 0.31
0.77
ln(COVRATIOED) 0.00
0.03
DEPINSD, bank country -0.70
-1.11
DEPINSD, customer country 2.07
1.35
DEPINSURE 1.40 1.59
1.11 1.30
ln(TRADEVOL) 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.38 0.35 0.52 0.51 0.50 0.53 0.45 0.52 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.32 0.32 0.29 0.32
4.45 4.45 4.44 4.35 4.45 4.44 4.41 4.35 3.48 3.19 4.43 4.41 4.45 4.83 3.87 4.63 4.30 4.44 4.51 2.45 4.44 4.35 4.41 4.45 4.45 4.45 2.95 3.00 1.74 3.00
countrylender dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
countryborrower dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
adjusted R2 0.838 0.838 0.838 0.839 0.838 0.839 0.838 0.839 0.842 0.845 0.838 0.838 0.838 0.839 0.838 0.839 0.838 0.838 0.838 0.865 0.838 0.838 0.838 0.838 0.838 0.838 0.848 0.849 0.879 0.849
number of observations 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 496 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 496 877
Table A6: Fixed effects model selection
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 4 Reg 5 Reg 6 Reg 7 Reg 8 Reg 9 Reg 10 Reg 11 Reg12 Reg 13 Reg 14 Reg 15
SIZE 0.83 0.84 0.78 0.77 0.82 0.83 0.80 0.80 0.94 0.76 0.83 0.68 0.74 0.88 0.77
1.18 1.19 1.10 1.08 1.16 1.17 1.13 1.14 1.36 1.06 1.18 0.93 1.05 1.26 1.09
SIMILAR_CRE -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 -0.21 -0.20 -0.18 -0.18 -0.16 -0.20 -0.26 -0.20 -0.18 -0.17 -0.26
-0.92 -0.94 -0.93 -0.92 -1.01 -0.94 -0.83 -0.85 -0.78 -0.94 -1.20 -0.92 -0.85 -0.78 -1.20
REL_CRE -0.07 -0.10 -0.10 -0.18 -0.08 -0.07 -0.04 -0.09 -0.12 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.20 -0.24 -0.16
-0.33 -0.50 -0.49 -0.93 -0.42 -0.36 -0.22 -0.45 -0.63 -0.31 -0.20 -0.30 -1.03 -1.25 -0.81
ln(FRGBNKED) -0.02 -0.02
-0.59 -0.48
ln(FRGBNKbank country) -0.05
-0.79
ln(FRGBNKcustomer country) -0.17 -0.16 -0.17 -0.17
-3.59 -3.50 -3.59 3.58
ln(POLED) -0.09
-0.87
ln(CORRUPED) -0.02
-0.81
ln(GOVEFFED) 0.02
0.84
ln(POLSTABED) -0.05 -0.04
-1.89 -1.67
ln(REGQALED) -0.11 -0.11
-2.69 -2.73
ln(VOICEED) 0.04
1.02
ln(LAWED) -0.12 -0.11
-1.93 -1.90
ln(TRADEVOL) 0.14
0.90
adjusted R2 0.938 0.938 0.938 0.939 0.938 0.938 0.938 0.938 0.938 0.938 0.938 0.938 0.939 0.939 0.939
number of observations 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807 807
Panel A1: Cross-border loans
Note: In each regression, the dependent variable is the log of bilateral cross-border loan volume. The Fixed Effects model is a two-way fixed analysis with country-pair and time fixed
effects and is estimated with White-robust standard errors. For each coefficient, the first row shows the estimated coefficient and the second row the t-statistic. The subscript ED
indicates a variable measured as an Euclidean distance where larger values indicate larger differences between bank country and customer country. 
Table A6: Fixed effects model selection
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 4 Reg 5 Reg 6 Reg 7 Reg 8 Reg 9 Reg 10 Reg 11 Reg 12 Reg 13 Reg 14 Reg 15 Reg 16
SIZE -0.13 -0.18 -0.26 -0.32 -0.15 -0.16 -0.15 -0.18 -0.06 -0.23 -0.10 -0.49 -0.34 -0.25 -0.35 -0.63
-0.18 -0.25 -0.35 -0.46 -0.22 -0.22 -0.21 -0.26 -0.08 -0.32 -0.15 -0.67 -0.49 -0.35 -0.49 -0.85
SIMILAR_GDP -0.90 -0.96 -0.96 -1.04 -0.94 -0.95 -0.83 -0.95 -0.75 -0.96 -0.90 -0.93 -1.09 -0.89 -0.95 -0.97
-1.67 -1.78 -1.75 -1.94 -1.76 -1.78 -1.53 -1.76 -1.38 -1.78 -1.68 -1.73 -2.05 -1.66 -1.78 -1.82
REL_GDP 0.98 0.94 0.92 0.86 0.98 0.98 0.98 1.06 0.79 1.07 0.92 1.01 0.87 0.67 0.76 0.78
2.46 2.38 2.32 2.14 2.46 2.48 2.46 2.59 1.99 2.68 2.23 2.54 2.15 1.68 1.89 1.94
ln(FRGBNKED) -0.03
-0.95
ln(FRGBNKbank country) -0.08
-1.30
ln(FRGBNKcustomer country) -0.16 -0.15 -0.15 -0.16 -0.15
-3.22 -3.16 -3.19 -3.23 -3.1
ln(POLED) -0.06
-0.55
ln(CORRUPED) -0.05 -0.04
-1.82 -1.68
ln(GOVEFFED) 0.04
1.29
ln(POLSTABED) -0.04
-1.29
ln(REGQALED) -0.13 -0.12 -0.13 -0.12
-2.86 -2.87 -2.9 -2.88
ln(VOICEED) 0.06 0.07 0.06
1.80 1.84 1.7
ln(LAWED) -0.05
-0.74
ln(TRADEVOL) 0.27 0.21
2.21 1.78
adjusted R2 0.930 0.930 0.930 0.931 0.930 0.930 0.930 0.930 0.931 0.931 0.930 0.931 0.931 0.932 0.932 0.932
number of observations 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 842
Panel A2: Cross-border loans
Table A6: Fixed effects model selection
Panel B1: Cross-border deposits
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 4 Reg 5 Reg 6 Reg 7 Reg 8 Reg 9 Reg 10 Reg 11 Reg 12 Reg 13 Reg 14 Reg 15 Reg 16 Reg 17 Reg 18 Reg 19 Reg 20
SIZE 2.50 2.51 2.46 2.48 2.52 2.52 2.46 2.53 2.52 2.65 2.50 1.94 2.63 2.56 2.60 2.55 2.70 2.69 2.75 2.53
3.32 3.31 3.29 3.29 3.34 3.35 3.28 3.37 3.36 3.50 3.30 2.67 3.31 3.37 3.38 3.40 3.56 3.57 3.62 3.37
SIMILAR_CRE 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.81 0.84 0.84 0.79 0.72 0.85 0.79 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.79 0.75 0.81
4.13 4.13 4.14 4.14 4.15 4.20 4.18 4.05 4.16 4.25 3.84 3.57 4.20 3.88 4.16 4.11 4.25 3.96 3.74 4.04
REL_CRE -0.17 -0.18 -0.22 -0.21 -0.16 -0.16 -0.14 -0.14 -0.18 -0.18 -0.15 -0.22 -0.14 -0.20 -0.17 -0.12 -0.13 -0.11 -0.14 -0.16
-0.84 -0.86 -1.06 -1.01 -0.77 -0.76 -0.68 -0.70 -0.87 -0.89 -0.75 -1.11 -0.69 -0.98 -0.84 -0.61 -0.65 -0.56 -0.69 -0.76
ln(FRGBNKED) -0,00 -0.01
-0.12 -0.29
ln(FRGBNKbank country) -0.05
-1.48
ln(FRGBNKcustomer country) -0.05
-0.98
ln(POLED) 0.08
0.71
ln(CORRUPED) 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
2.21 2.28 2.59 2.37 2.44
ln(GOVEFFED) 0.04
1.42
ln(POLSTABED) 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
1.94 1.97 1.97 2.10 2.19 1.96
ln(REGQALED) -0.01
-0.29
ln(VOICEED) -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09
-3.20 -3.27 -3.12 -3.10
ln(LAWED) -0.09 -0.08 -0.08
-1.93 -1.91 -1.79
ln(COVRATIObank country) -0.85
-2.32
ln(COVRATIOcustomer country) 0.20
0.74
ln(COVRATIOED) 0.06 0.06
1.84 1.91
ln(TRADEVOL) -0.12
0.65
adjusted R2 0.944 0.944 0.944 0.944 0.944 0.944 0.944 0.944 0.944 0.945 0.944 0.945 0.944 0.944 0.944 0.944 0.945 0.945 0.945 0.944
number of observations 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839
Table A6: Fixed effects model selection
Panel B2: Cross-border deposits
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 4 Reg 5 Reg 6 Reg 7 Reg 8 Reg 9 Reg 10 Reg 11 Reg 12 Reg 13 Reg 14 Reg 15 Reg 16 Reg 17 Reg 18 Reg 19
SIZE 1.58 1.63 1.57 1.59 1.63 1.60 1.56 1.61 1.54 1.64 1.58 1.02 1.79 1.51 1.72 1.59 1.57 1.65 1.07
2.31 2.42 2.32 2.32 2.39 2.35 2.29 2.35 2.28 2.39 2.32 1.47 2.47 2.19 2.48 2.33 2.31 2.42 1.56
SIMILAR_GDP -0.32 -0.25 -0.32 -0.31 -0.23 -0.26 -0.23 -0.29 -0.38 -0.27 -0.32 -0.70 -0.18 -0.31 -0.27 -0.17 -0.32 -0.12 -0.51
-0.72 -0.57 -0.73 -0.70 -0.52 -0.59 -0.52 -0.66 -0.86 -0.61 -0.72 -1.54 -0.39 -0.71 -0.62 -0.39 -0.73 -0.27 -1.12
REL_GDP 2.87 2.93 2.86 2.88 2.87 2.86 2.87 2.82 2.94 2.80 2.86 2.94 2.81 2.97 2.86 2.86 2.94 2.79 2.87
9.22 9.31 9.15 8.92 9.25 9.25 9.26 9.03 9.37 8.89 8.84 9.54 8.84 9.10 9.22 9.30 9.39 8.96 9.27
ln(FRGBNKED) 0.03
1.05
ln(FRGBNKbank country) -0.01
-0.21
ln(FRGBNKcustomer country) 0.01
0.21
ln(POLED) 0.13
1.14
ln(CORRUPED) 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04
2.47 2.50 2.43 2.70 2.48
ln(GOVEFFED) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
1.69 1.73 1.76 1.91
ln(POLSTABED) 0.02
0.90
ln(REGQALED) 0.05 0.05
1.68 1.64
ln(VOICEED) -0.05 -0.06 -0.06
-2.03 -2.17 -2.29
ln(LAWED) -0.01
-0.13
ln(COVRATIObank country) -0.57 -0.59
-2.63 -2.73
ln(COVRATIOcustomer country) 0.22
1.15
ln(COVRATIOED) -0.04
-1.21
ln(TRADEVOL) -0.18
-1.06
adjusted R2 0.950 0.950 0.950 0.950 0.950 0.950 0.950 0.950 0.950 0.950 0.950 0.950 0.945 0.950 0.950 0.950 0.950 0.951 0.951
number of observations 877 877 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 839
